What do Manchester United and English water companies have in common? Not a great deal you might say beyond being not very successful at what they do. Once a football titan, Man U is now a has-been. Twice a recent winner of the Champions League and regular semi-finalist, the club now struggles to get out of the competition’s group stage. The winner of 13 Premier League titles since 1992, it now cannot compete with its rivals across the city of Manchester, not to mention numerous other clubs.
English water companies, meanwhile, are notorious for not doing their basic job of ensuring clean water in rivers and seas. Despite it being a legal requirement, they have not invested in infrastructure, preferring to pay out enormous dividends to their investors. And the real level of the pollution may be much higher than the firms admit.
But delve a bit deeper and there is something else that unites these two apparently disparate ‘businesses’*. They are both creatures of private equity (PE). Private equity is where a firm is taken off the stock market by a takeover. The new owners borrow the money to acquire the target company in what is called a ‘leveraged buyout’, in the process loading it down with massive debt. Once acquired, along with interest payments on the debt, large dividends are prioritised, either solely for the owners or for their investors/clients.
A family club
Manchester United, for example, had been a public limited firm (i.e. anyone could buy shares in it) from 1991 until 2005 when it was taken private by the Glazer family in a £790m leveraged buyout. Virtually debt-free since 1931, the club’s net debt now stands at £500m and has been much higher. Man U pays over £18m in annual interest on that debt and, unusually for a football club, £32m in yearly dividend payments to the Glazers.
Private Equity ownership is now more common for football clubs (think of Chelsea) but Manchester United provides an opportunity to observe the effect of PE ownership over time – and the picture is not a good one. This is not a financial crisis, which football clubs are especially susceptible to, but the mature consequence of a particular type of financial regime. No wonder fans are desperate for the Glazers to sell up.
Now consider the ten English water companies, all but three of whom have been taken off the stock market by their private equity owners. The commonalities with Manchester United are striking. When Thatcher privatised the ‘industry’ in 1989, it had its existing £5bn debt written off. Since then the debt pile has mushroomed to £60bn. The debt of the largest water company, Thames Water, rose from £3.4bn to £10.8 billion after it was acquired by Australian investment bank, Macquarie, in 2007 and now the firm is in danger of bankruptcy. Since privatisation, over £70bn in dividends has been paid out while bills have increased by 40%, while increases of a similar scale are forecast to deal with the sewage spills that have been allowed to happen.
In either case, what you might think of as the primary function – winning trophies or ensuring clean water – has taken a back seat in favour of maximising returns to the owners.
‘Public’ versus Private capitalism
Maximising returns, you might say, is simply what capitalism does and you’re not wrong as Walter from The Big Lebowski would doubtless attest. However, as English academic Carolyn Sissoko argues, the ‘old fashioned’ way of maximising returns through ‘public’ corporations at least sometimes had a collateral benefit in the shape of capital investment leading to products that people wanted to buy. What happens under private equity capitalism is an entirely valueless process in which the only beneficiaries are extremely rich people becoming even richer. Actually it’s worse than that. Private Equity destroys value for everyone else – consumers, workers, supporters, target companies – apart from the owners who make out like bandits. As Sissoko puts it:
Whereas the corporate form is a win-win for the economy when it is used to facilitate the raising of funds for large projects that could not otherwise by completed such as railroads or trans-oceanic cables, the corporate form is transformed into a win-lose for the economy when it is used to impose huge debt burdens on otherwise successful corporations.
And this particular form of capitalism is on the march. According to Sissoko, private equity now controls more than 10% of the US stock market, up from 0% 40 years ago. And she says it is “positioned to continue displacing the public corporate form at a rapid pace”.
Where America leads, Britain dutifully follows and PE on these shores is, in the description of advertising sultan Martin Sorrell, “rampant”. Supermarkets such as Morrisons and Asda are PE-owned as was Debenhams before its demise. And in addition to water companies, many care homes have been taken over by private equity firms.
It is important to stress here that the critics of PE are not merely saying the practice is perverting organisations that have – or should have – a social purpose at their heart. It is doing that obviously but by loading down for-profit companies with huge debt – procured in order to take them over – PE is, in a supreme effort of self-destruction, warping capitalism itself. The frighteningly large level of global corporate debt, which has increased by double the rate of personal and financial debt since 2007 (which have also risen exponentially) can be attributed, at least in part, to the modus operandi of private equity. And while this debt mountain may have been manageable in the context of rock-bottom interest rates, as rates have risen, the debt-ridden concoctions of PE are – as shown by the travails of Thames Water – becoming more and more exposed.
No paradox
This is not a new problem though one that hasn’t been around for a while. In the 19th century, Karl Marx bemoaned the existence of ‘usury capital’ – money lent purely to maximise the interest paid to the lender. This was in contrast to ‘industrial capital’ which had a social purpose in that it purchased shares in – and thus financed – enterprises which made new products or changed the way they were produced. The former, he said, “does not alter the mode of production, but attaches itself as a parasite and makes it miserable. It sucks its blood, kills its nerve, and compels reproduction to proceed under even more disheartening conditions.”
For usury capital in the Victorian age, read Private Equity today.
Brett Christophers, the Sweden-based academic and author of the exposé of PE, Our Lives in their Portfolios, has previously noted the interesting fact that Adam Smith – the darling of the Right and father of market economics and Marx – the pre-eminent left-wing critic of capitalism – shared “the belief that it was entirely possible for an activity to be revenue- and profit-generative without actually contributing to the creation of value. There was no paradox.”
And we are now in an era where value, once again, is not being created. As contemporary economist Michael Hudson has documented, PE is just one of several ways that ‘activist shareholders’, hedge funds and banks have, since the 1980s, increased looked upon public listed companies as cash cows to be looted regardless of the long-term consequences. Illegal until the Thatcher and Reagan eras, share buy-backs are now commonplace for corporations. In the US, Apple, IBM, Exxon Mobil, and Proctor & Gamble are some of the most famous exponents. In the UK, recent practitioners include BP, Shell, Diageo (Guinness, Smirnoff etc.), HSBC, and Unilever.
Share buy-backs are often undertaken under pressure from large shareholders and the company will, not infrequently, swallow a “poison pill” (in Hudson’s words), placing itself in severe debt to purchase its own stock. The effect of a share buy-back is to reduce the overall number of a company’s shares, thereby increasing capital gains and dividend pay outs to its existing shareholders. But its side-effect is to shrink the amount of capital the company has to invest in research and development and growing its own business.
But some companies, says Hudson, have stubbornly resisted the trend and concentrated on building up their business. He cites the example of Google, which, at least in its early days, aimed to use “corporate profits to expand the business rather than giving quick hit-and-run returns to the wealthiest One Percent.”**
Capitalism will eat itself
But this highlights a fatal flaw in the arguments of those who criticise private equity – and kindred financial innovations – for subverting capitalism. Google may have defied the financial bloodsuckers and concentrated on R&D but the effect of this, although good for Google’s health as a business (it’s worth over $1 trillion now apparently), cannot be classed as beneficial for society as a whole. Its innovations have consisted in myriad ways to beguile the attention-spans of billions of people so that they can be exposed to more advertising. If this is a “win-win”, in Sissoko’s description, I think we need to re-define what we mean by winning.
Google is also an intimate part of the whole Big Tech social media revolution which, because it is founded on getting people to compare themselves to others, is having a corroding effect on mental health. From 2018 to 2023, Norway, for example, fell from 3rd place in the world happiness league table to seventh because of a decline among its young people. And – an assiduously cultivated – addiction to social media also certainly lies behind that.
Likewise, if oil companies want to buy back their own shares rather than putting all available resources into drilling for oil and gas deposits, thereby intensifying global warming, why should we try to talk them out of it?
Why, this time around, should we be the ones – in erstwhile Keynesian fashion – to ‘save capitalism from itself’?
It is a good question.
To be continued
* H/T to a friend who pointed out the link
** Quote from Hudson’s Killing the Host which is well worth reading
