Thursday, 13 February 2014

The relevance and irrelevance of Marxism. An interview with economist, Harry Shutt


Long considered a historical relic, Marxian economics is experiencing something of a renaissance. In contrast to the exhaustion and lack of explanatory power of mainstream economic theories, Marxism offers a ready-made alternative way of interpreting the world. It is described by two proponents as “reality-based economics”. But is an economics laid out in the 19th century still relevant? And if we agree that Marxism contains insights, do we need to be selective about which parts we give credence to? I put these questions to English economist, Harry Shutt, who though not a Marxist, says he is influenced by Marx (among others):


 You responded to a recent blog post by saying that we need to transcend Marxist economics. I’m intrigued by what you mean by this. Does this  mean an economics that retains parts of Marxism but rejects others as redundant and out of date? Which parts?

Precisely. The central part of Marxism, to me, to give credit where it’s due, Marx-Engelism, is the historical method. This is what Engels, in particular, called ‘scientific socialism’. His most famous work is Socialism: Utopian and Scientific and he contrasts the utopian socialism of people like Robert Owen and the idealists with those who saw it as based on hard economics - the fact that you have some things that work and some things that don’t work. Clearly, capitalism, as then conceived, did not work because of the crisis of overproduction. All that was true then and is true now and we have to retain that.

But the other thing that was more important in a way, which Marx and co stressed, in particular, was the technology aspect of things. That is reflected in their historical method, the idea that we are evolving as a species, not just in the Darwinian sense, but in the collective sense of organisation. The major factor behind this is technology. They demonstrated this brilliantly in The Communist Manifesto - why the cottage industries had to disappear and, by organising factory production as they did, people could be so much better off and more productive, awful as the conditions were which existed in the earlier Victorian period. The part that was wrong about the Marxist prospectus is this idea that the evolution of this process would lead to the collapse of capitalism and its replacement with the dominance of the proletariat.

I believe that if Marx were around today, he would say that people who still believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat or that workers, as workers, could or should be in control, were sentimental fetishists. Fetishism is a good Marxist word. André Gorz wrote this book at least 35 years ago, Farewell to the Working Class. Even by the time he wrote the book in the late 1970s, it was pretty obvious that the old skilled working class was disappearing. In those days, it was numerically controlled machine tools that were coming in and making the old time-served turners and fitters completely obsolete. They are now museum pieces.

Technology has changed things. Since Marx wrote all this stuff 150 years ago, and he was living the consequences of the development of the first industrial revolution, we’ve had the second industrial revolution and we now seem to be in the third. And that is rendering the whole idea of large concentrations of labour completely outmoded. I’m amazed that it’s not obvious and that’s why I’m staggered that people like Richard Wolff, who’s obviously otherwise a very intelligent person and understands the failings of the system, and other Marxists, still seem to think that some of kind of workers’ control is the way forward. I would argue that even in the UK, which has not exactly been at the forefront of socialist thinking, but even in the UK, that idea, syndicalism as it was known then, died out after the First World War.

 So what is valuable in Marxism is the recognition that technologies changes and that alters what human beings can do and how productive they are, but the idea that the proletarian can take over and run society that is not true …

It’s actually not clear what Marx meant, but a lot of people have inferred that he meant the workers are going to take over. It was that presumption upon which the Bolshevik Revolution was based, although the workers didn’t take over society. But the theory was that they were going to, and that’s certainly a clear presumption behind Leninism.

 But given that technology is changing what can be done in terms of production but that the working class is not able or is not constituted to take over society, then who is going to change society? Does technology just go on developing?

That is a difficult question to answer. But just because you conclude that labour is not going to do it, organised or otherwise, then that doesn’t mean you see any group exclusively in that role. But what needs to be taken account of is that people are developing solutions at a grassroots level, some of which will work, others won’t, which are seeking to overcome the problem. The word ‘community’ is being used more, and it’s rather a vague word, but people are going to organise in community groups and local groups too, very often. But I see one of the trends of our time, and where it’s leading I can’t be sure, is for people to organise production and finance and markets on a local basis. There are outbreaks of local currencies, you have ‘The Bristol Pound’, and this is a revolt against extreme globalisation, which means that you may have a perfectly decent factory providing, for example, processed food through your local market and suddenly someone can come in from outside and dump a rival product, shall we say UHT milk, from China or somewhere to quote an extreme example, costing next to nothing and that can take away your market and destroy your livelihood. Only a complete lunatic would say that that is a viable and sensible way to organise things but that is what is happening. People are rebelling against that.

 What solutions do you see as viable?

I don’t think there’s ever been a case in history, as the Soviet Union demonstrates, where somebody has designed a blueprint which was imposed from above and that has actually worked. You can only do it under totalitarian conditions and totalitarian conditions contain the seeds of their own destruction. You are going to have to evolve but it will have to evolve under the circumstances of extreme localism. To start with that will mean a serious revolt against globalisation. I think this is beginning to happen, when you see what is happening in Europe over immigration, for example. It is clearly not viable to go on pretending that we can have a completely free labour market in Europe, let alone one which admits, legally or otherwise, millions of people from outside Europe, on the basis that they can take work from people anywhere. That is a recipe for fascism, frankly, and that is where we are heading at the moment. I would suspect, as much as I support the idea of international cooperation, which I hope will not be lost, that what is going to happen is that there will probably be a break-up, not just in Europe but elsewhere, to more fragmented markets, or more separate markets. And people will say we are going to have our own production, our own distribution and we will trade with other countries, we will exchange labour with them, on a negotiated basis, as and when it suits both parties.


So, not having a free labour market in Europe means restrictions on freedom of movement? Does that not involve more deportations of ‘illegal’ immigrants and the ugly use of state power to enforce a ban on economic migration?

Limiting opportunities to seek employment across borders is not the same as restricting freedom of movement. As I tried to suggest in the previous answer, what I envisage is a system of international cooperation - in place of the current jungle of globalisation - in which a) there would be greater emphasis on fostering local provision of goods and services supporting employment of the local population - as well as limiting environmentally undesirable trade in goods which can be sourced locally - and b) income differences between countries would be progressively compressed by regulation. Given the huge existing disparities this would have to be supplemented, at least initially, by international transfers on the basis that these would be the distributed in the form of a Universal Basic Income, albeit not uniform across boundaries. This implies total rejection of the whole ‘race to the bottom’ concept based on the assumption that maximisation of corporate profits is the supreme public good. This would, of course, involve limiting freedom of capital movement as well. In general, though, the emphasis would be on promoting the positive rather than restricting the negative.

So, in the regions or nations that would negotiate their exchanges with other regions or nations, who would control production and distribution? There are leftists – and Marxists - who say enterprises should be controlled by their workforce but you dismiss this as anachronistic. In your books, you say often say the public in general should have voice on the boards of companies. But if we need a new organisation of enterprise, different to the shareholder/corporate model, what should it be?

If I said that the idea of workers' control was anachronistic I was being too kind. It is, in fact, irrational from almost any perspective. It seems logical that in the management of any economy or enterprise production, distribution, prices and incomes should be determined in a way that balances the interests of citizens in their different capacities as consumers, taxpayers, workers, residents of specific localities etc. Workers' exclusive control is thus illogical and discriminatory as well as impractical - if it means workers would also own the enterprise, what happens to their rights as owners when they leave or retire? How will they cope with loss of competitiveness or bankruptcy, as Mondragon businesses have found to be an issue?

The general principle should be that power be devolved as much as possible to the local level. Different forms of enterprise and ownership can be envisaged - including private, cooperative or community ownership - provided all play within the same transparent rules. Overall conformity with the public interest would in principle be assured by representative public bodies licensing enterprises and setting the conditions under which they operate. This would also imply the need for some degree of planning at local, regional and national levels to prevent monopoly exploitation, market disruption and waste of resources.

That also requires a complete rethink of the neoliberal philosophy within markets, and within countries. You have to go back first principles, and ask the questions; What is an economy for? What is it supposed to achieve? Is it the desire to maximise growth, which we are constantly being told it is, and that has been the main theme for the whole of my working life, although that was certainly not the aim before World War Two? People were much more concerned just with survival. The other thing is to look at things like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It gives you a clue, the idea of an economy is to provide people with a decent standard of living. There are, of course, different definitions as to what one might mean by that. But quite clearly it should not involve people having to go and beg and humiliate themselves at food banks, which is what we’ve come to. They would now have us believe that this is a normal part of life and what people should accept.

At a time when entrepreneurs and wealthy investors are lauded as ‘wealth creators’ granting the gift of life to the rest of us, isn’t Marx’s labour theory of value important – the recognition that value or wealth comes from labour and people are exploited when they are employed?

The short answer is no. To me, the labour theory of value has always been rather a puzzle in Marxism. Marx got the idea from Ricardo who was certainly not a worshipper of labour. And what he meant by the labour theory of value in determining labour’s share of output is, I think, very hard to pin down. I’ve never quite understood why Marx took it up. The only reason I can advance is that he also had this concept of alienation and part of the significance of that was that labour was engaged in producing all this stuff and the factory system was at the core of things then and there were no robots or anything. Workers were producing all these cheap goods which were exported all over the world and made a few people very rich here, but the workers couldn’t afford to buy them themselves. That was tied up with his view of alienation – in other words, that workers were just cogs in the machine, and were therefore dehumanised.

 What is wealth, then, and how is it created?

I’m looking at it from the collective point of view, which I think Marx would have done too. Wealth is what belongs to all of us. Only in the last few years have I come across this idea, I think it’s called cognitive capitalism. You look around and you see that all the wealth we have around us, whether it’s the public or social infrastructure, the schools, the hospitals, all these things we’ve accumulated over the centuries,  are based on our collective effort. The important point to hang onto is the idea that it is collective, that this belongs to all of us. Therefore to suggest either that it only belongs to wealth creators and this is only made possible by people who have invested their money, supposedly at risk (though in most cases they made damn sure there weren’t any risks), or, on the other hand, by workers who have created it all by the sweat of their brow, this is a mistake. Because, in fact, it’s a combination of all these things. Anyway, the sweat of the brow, insofar as that’s been involved, was shed by people long dead. We can’t say that we’re entitled to more of it, or a share of it because we’re workers now, when, in fact, it was our forebears who sweated and died to produce it. That is, to me, the proper way of viewing it. This comes back to that famous phrase, quoted by Isaac Newton, that “we stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before”.

 I recall a year or two ago somebody wrote a defence of Rupert Murdoch, saying he fed 40,000 people. They didn’t mean he donated to charity but he employed 40,000 people thereby giving them the gift of life and the ability to feed their families. A lot of politicians come out with a similar idea – there are very rich people who have the ability to grant us jobs or increases in our wealth, and we should give them what they want. I think if you want to challenge that idea, you have to come at the idea of wealth creation from a different point of view

What you have just described is an important point to note. But, to my mind, it’s rather obvious – it does not differ in any way from what our feudal masters were saying hundreds of years ago – in other words, we created this and we provided the land and the employment for people and, as a result of that, you are entitled to survive. The implicit idea in that case was that God gave it to them, or the King as was often the case. Another philosopher, whose work is rather contemptible, is John Locke. He developed the idea that anyone who appropriates some land and develops and uses it, because they produce more from it than the original inhabitants, it belongs to them. That idea was somehow related to Calvinist religion and that people who were chosen by God, or were given the opportunity to take hold of the Garden of Eden and turn it into an earthly paradise by their own efforts, somehow deserved more than the rest of us, even though the reason for this distribution of wealth, in the first place, which enabled them to do this, was nothing to do with merit whatsoever. It was purely an accident of birth. And that is really what it comes down to today.

Another thing, which was much mocked by Dickens in Hard Times, was this myth of the self-made man. Nowadays, you get the same sort of thing. Whereas in reality, there are so many cases of people who have come by their wealth and assets by more or less dubious means. The idea that they have a superior right to tell everyone else what to do, is medieval.

 Do we need entrepreneurs to think of new products and new ways of doing things, and are they entitled to more than other people?

No. I’m not saying entrepreneurs are a bad thing. But if you choose to be an entrepreneur like James Dyson, to go out and invent a new vacuum cleaner, if that’s what turns him on, that could be good. He should be properly recognised and rewarded for that. But that doesn’t mean he has the right to go around saying that nobody else should be able to make a vacuum cleaner like his, or if they do, he should be able to take a commission on it. Intellectual property is theft.

Entrepreneurs, inventors, thinkers, they are one of the glories of the human race, really. But inventing new things, finding a cure for cancer or whatever, this is a desirable thing in its own right and if somebody contributes exceptionally to bringing these kinds of things about, then they deserve recognition and compensation for their achievements. That should be enough satisfaction for them. To think that they should also be allowed to rule the world, that’s something else.

 Is an entrepreneur in this sense, different from a person who just has lots of money and invests and creates a new company and jobs? That’s not necessarily an advance, it’s just that they have money and they want more money, and a by-product of that is that some people get jobs?

You’re touching on something else and it’s a very valid point. What you’re talking about is the capitalist urge to growth. This is one of the problems the system suffers from. The profit motive is based on a system of company law, which actually makes shareholders the priority, that they should determine entirely freely, how the resources of a country are disposed of. That inevitably means that you’re going to have a system of profit maximisation and that profit maximisation, in turn, must lead to more investment which leads to speculation and falling rate of profit and busts. It’s all very familiar stuff. And that’s why the only way to prevent that is to change company law so that, in the first instance, limited liability is denied to anyone who does not demonstrate that they are doing something in the public interest, and that has to be constantly monitored. It’s a privilege in other words. It’s an irony that, in many ways, that would take us back to the kind of pre-industrial, if not pre-capitalist, structure of the economy that existed before Adam Smith. The profit motive in the 16th century, was expressed through chartered companies, like the Hudson’s Bay Company or the East India Company. They had a monopoly to go and trade in certain things, but that was granted by the state, the crown and people, in theory and sometimes in practice, had to deliver something back to the state. In many cases, it was just plunder from the Far East, it wasn’t a public good, but that’s the principle. You shouldn’t have any privileges as an enterprise or an entrepreneur, unless you agree in advance to give something back.

Many people recognise how destructive the profit maximising motive is, but effectively with our company law you are institutionalising that. You are saying, not merely that you are permitted to go out and maximise your profits, but you are compelled to do so. It compels you to worship at the altar of the golden calf.

 Isn’t Marxian economics’ recognition that capitalism’s leads to monopoly and oligopoly (truly competitive markets don’t last) and that capitalism is unavoidably unstable (you can’t get rid of boom and bust) also essential if we want to really understand the way the world works?

Absolutely, that is central. Marx was the first person to point these things out. I’m not deeply into the history of economic thought but if there was one economist who recognised this before Marx, it was Malthus, because he pointed out to Ricardo that it was possible to produce more goods than the market could absorb and Ricardo rather dismissed the idea. The contrast there is with Say’s Law, the idea that supply creates its own demand. In many ways, the labour theory of value, which was more like a Ricardian idea, was restatement of Say’s Law because at one level the labour theory of value amounts to saying, ‘I produce, therefore I am’. This was the effectively unchallenged principle of the Soviet Union. One reason why they got into trouble was that they said that even if you exceed your planned target for the manufacture of glass bottles, for example, all you will do is drive down the price and that will benefit everybody. The idea that it was a complete waste of resources never occurred to them.

 One Marxist economist, Andrew Kliman, attributes the ‘malaise’ (as he puts it) in the world economy to the tendency of the rate of profit to decline. But you locate the problem in excess capital (a ‘wall of money’ as you phrase it) needing profitable outlets. Are these two ideas very different and in conflict?

I don’t think they are really. I’m not familiar with Kliman’s work but the tendency of the rate of profit to decline is undoubtedly there. What’s happened spectacularly over the last 40 years, since the post-war boom ended in the West, is that the capitalist establishment, the business community, has been preoccupied with ways of overcoming this problem and the ‘wall of money’ is certainly part of that. In other words, you create huge speculative ways which enable people to invest money in things that are totally unproductive. People have been writing about ‘casino capitalism’ since the 1960s and it becomes just a gambling den, based on speculation. There are people who will tell you that speculation is a valid economic activity that benefits the community and it helps price discovery. Quite honestly, I think such arguments are hardly worthy of consideration, it’s obviously self-destructive and irrational.

 So profit does have a tendency to fall and business is aware of this tendency?

Oh yes. Business in the widest sense. This is why we have this ludicrous superstructure of finance capital in the City of London, which is, in fact, organised gambling.

 Because you can’t make enough money from ordinary production?

No. And then you create ridiculous outlets for funds that are thought to be necessary like pension funds, which are completely unnecessary. You have these fetishisms which are widely held among all political classes in the UK which is that people are not saving enough for their retirement. People shouldn’t have to save anything for their retirement. They may choose to do so if they want to but the way things are now, a fat lot of good it will do them.

 So the tendency of the rate of profit to decline leads to speculation and more crashes?

Yes

What’s your view of political Marxism; the concept of a party that represents the working class and seeks to gain power either through a revolution or the ballot box, like the SWP in the UK? A party that attempts to control the state on behalf of the working class and the party knows best …

I would have total contempt for that and, again, like all political movements, political Marxism, in that sense, is no different from organised religion. In other words, it’s designed to give power, cloaked under some ideological mythology, to a certain group of people. Ultimately, quite apart from the fact that so many of these concepts on which it is based, are outmoded, like the labour theory of value, any structure which gives some mystical kind of authority to any individual or group of individuals, so they know better than other people, that is doomed to, not necessarily to failure, but it’s doomed to destroy people rather than help them.

 Given that there are conflicting interpretations about what’s happening in the world and you think you’re right about some things and you disagree with people who also think they are right, how do you get a political movement that avoids the pitfalls of parties and leaders and some people dominating others, how do you get agreement to happen and to manifest itself?

That’s the $64 trillion question. I wish I knew. One of the things I’ve been advocating for a good many years, as other people have, is the idea that you need to make it much more difficult for individual vested interests to get hold of the media, for example, or the airwaves. To overthrow the likes of Murdoch and Fox News, who do an awful lot of damage. As to how we are going to get away from that, in practice, I really don’t know. Let us hope that things like the Internet will open things up sufficiently to permit diversity of opinion, to change attitudes. But you can quite easily see how that can go the other way and, of course, the authorities in places like China and, indeed, closer to home, are desperately trying to do that, because they very much fear the consequences of being found out.

Right now we are living through a fascinating period, (you could call it fascinating if you’re not starving to death), where the means of control are breaking down, partly because the economic system itself is breaking down but you can’t see what’s going to come up to replace it and you get these confused movements, such as in Egypt which is a complete mess, but reflects precisely this kind of dilemma, although there are far worse conditions there than in most western countries. And, heaven knows how it will play out.

I’m about to write again about the determined unreason of our rulers. I’ve been brought up to believe that, for all their faults, our rulers have shown the capacity to adjust to inevitable change when they finally realised it couldn’t be avoided. That is something I’m beginning to doubt. If you look at what’s happening over climate change, quite clearly, if we don’t do something about it, we are all going to perish. You might say the human race has to come to an end anyway at some point, which is obviously true, but for people who are supposed to be the most intelligent creatures ever to exist on this planet, to destroy ourselves in this way seems hard to explain. I don’t think Marx would have been able to explain it.

 Britain and Europe seem trapped inside a winless logic that says we need growth to have employment and thus generate the taxes to pay for social services. But because growth is so insipid, you need to rip up regulations and protection for workers and cut corporate taxation. We need an escape from this growth/wealth prison but how do you mount a “prison break” that doesn’t just result in mass poverty?

That’s a rhetorical question, really. You can’t do it within the existing economic system. In many ways, this point was made by Lord Beveridge. Because you talk about workers’ benefits and the welfare state and Beveridge’s report was highly influential in determining the kind of welfare state that emerged in Britain after the Second World War. He himself said, and this was already known from experience after the First World War, that you couldn’t have a system of welfare, paying out benefits, in an economy that was so unstable that it would fluctuate up and down. He said the whole thing was posited on the basis of maintaining more or less full employment. That’s what’s been totally invalidated. It’s not just capitalist instability, it’s also technological change. You have to have mechanisms for income distribution that overcome these problems and you can’t do that if you just leave everything to speculators and the stock exchange, to put it mildly.

It’s high time we moved on but heaven knows if we will.

Sunday, 2 February 2014

Living standards and economic growth; a depressing tango


At the risk of sounding like an anally retentive stat obsessive, I found some interesting figures about real wage growth in Britain, or its absence, on Saturday and put them together with statistics on GDP growth (alright I admit I’ve got a problem but it’s one way to spend your weekend).

Both sets of figures are from the Office for National Statistics. Real wages mean the increase or decrease in the value of wages taking account of the effect of inflation.



UK GDP growth %
UK real wage increase %
1970-1980
2.55
2.9
1980-1990
2.67
2.9
1990-2000
2.22
1.5
2000-2010
1.82
1.2
2010-2014
1.32
-2.2



What’s interesting is that wage growth, and now wage decline, has tracked GDP quite closely, and GDP has fallen substantially since the end of the ‘80s and since the ‘60s. According to ONS figures, annual growth in Britain averaged 3.27% from 1960 to 1970. The figures are quite kind to Margaret Thatcher, it should be said, since the second Thatcherite recession began in the first quarter of 1990 when she was still Prime Minister.

The drop in the increase in wages was very definitely apparent in the 1990s and 2000s when virtually no-one thought there was a problem. Now there is wage decline, an awful lot of people have noticed the problem. The conventional liberal-left explanation is that Thatcher’s war on the unions and the decline in collective bargaining has belatedly fed through to how well employees are paid. I’m sure this is a factor – the precipitous drop in real wage increases from the 1980s to the 1990s, has doubtless a lot to do with the “Thatcher effect”. But that is not the whole story. Wages have faltered as growth has declined. Frances O’Grady, general secretary of trade union representative body, the TUC, said in response to the wage figures that “average pay rises have been getting weaker in every decade since the 1980s, despite increases in productivity, growth and profits”. But productivity and growth have also been getting weaker. I believe there is hardly any chance of the UK economy turning things around and returning to the growth levels of ‘60s, ‘70s or ‘80s. In those circumstances, real wages will either continue to decline or, at best, show slight increases.

The figures are evidence of an economic system in decline and the prospects for most people, while TINA is securely ensconced in the political consciousness, are not enticing. Consumer debt, which has trebled since the early ‘90s in the context of faltering wage growth, is likely to grow even larger, leading to further economic tremors.






Wednesday, 29 January 2014

How do you solve a problem like capitalism? Economic democracy versus the abolition of profit


In an interview on this blog last year, Hjalti Hrafn Hafthorsson of the Icelandic organisation Alda, put the case for an intrinsically different kind of economy. Companies, he argued, should be run as worker-controlled enterprises not as shareholder-owned entities managed by small boards of directors. With decisions guided by what employees want, rather than the legally prescribed imperative of maximising profit that determines current corporate behaviour, outcomes would be radically altered. Wealth would be more evenly distributed, companies would reflect what communities wanted and monopolies less likely to be formed.

 “I tend to believe,” Hafthorsson concluded, “that if working people were voting on some of the decisions made by corporate executives today many of those decisions would be overruled because people in general have values that aren’t measured in dollars or pounds.”

Alda’s vision of “economic democracy” is seen by many as a cure for the problems that plague society - inequality, stalling wages, environmental degradation, the dominance of large firms (in the energy ‘market’ for example) that exploit their captive consumers and companies’ footloose relationship with the communities that host them.

This means not merely a different way of reaching economic decisions, but the death of the shareholder. Workers, not wealthy investors or pension funds, would own as well as govern firms. It has been argued that the wider community should be represented on company boards, not just the workforce. Either way, what you have is an economy ostensibly geared towards the public interest, not private profit.

Taken together with the burgeoning movement for a basic, unconditional income, you can see the rudiments of an economy that values people, as opposed to things or profit. An economy, in other words, that treats people not as means to an end - economic survival and profit - but as ends in themselves, and gives them the freedom, and material security, to decide what is right for them.

“The difference, of course, is that we wouldn’t have capitalism anymore,” says Hafthorsson. But are these really the ways to transcend capitalism, or will we still be caught in its web?

There are some who think escape not so easy. The American Marxist, Andrew Kliman, looks upon capitalism as a network of relationships governed by immovable laws. You cannot simply “overrule” decisions because you don’t like them. It doesn’t matter, in this view, who is in charge or what their values are – whether they are money-grubbing psychopaths obsessed with profitability, or managers elected by the workforce, concerned above all else with the welfare of fellow employees and the effect of decisions on the wider community. Kliman is adamant that:

“Directives will not break the laws of capitalist production. The most important law is the determination of value by labor-time. It compels an enterprise, whoever owns or 'controls' it, to minimize costs in order to remain competitive, and therefore to lay off inefficient or unnecessary workers, speed up production, have unsafe working conditions, produce for profit instead of producing for need, and so on. If you are in a capitalist system, you cannot just issue a directive to produce for need, or a directive to refrain from laying off workers. Cutting costs is the key to survival.”


The disagreement as to what is and isn’t possible ultimately stems from contrasting definitions as to what capitalism is. Alda’s “economic democracy” stance reflects philosopher David Schweickart’s definition. Capitalism take places in the familiar “market economy”, yes, but the decisive characteristic, to Schweickart, is that it is based on wage labour. This means the vast majority of people have to rent themselves to the small minority that own companies, shops or offices in order gain the livelihood –  the wages, salaries or fees – that enables them to have a reasonable standard of life and not frequent food banks. Their need of an income means they are compelled to subject themselves to undemocratic rule at work and the baleful consequences of inequality, the dominance of huge firms and a lack of concern of external effects on society and the environment. The solution is to end the division between the elite that owns “the means of production” and the millions of people one or two payslips from bankruptcy. When workplaces are democratised, the argument runs, the behavioural characteristic of firms will change and seemingly intractable problems will become tractable. Values not “measured in dollars or pounds” would predominate. But this is decidedly not about the abolition of profit or competition. Profit will remain, it’s just that the people who receive it will alter.

Another way of describing this transformation is that it aims at the ‘democratisation of capital’.

However, to Kliman, this is based on a fundamental misconception of what capitalism really is. “Capital,” he writes, “is nothing other than value that is invested in order to end up with more value, so the fact that products have value is part and parcel of capitalism as such, no matter what its forms of property and institutional structures may be.” You can turn the institutions - the workplaces and corporations that overshadow our lives - upside down, you can put the people, not the corporate executives in the saddle, and nothing fundamental will change. Because any firm operating in a competitive economy will be drawn, however unwillingly, into the “grow or die” mentality that exists all around it, workers in a worker-controlled company will end up exploiting themselves.

You need do “do away” with capital, Kliman insists, and that requires doing away with commodities and the production of commodities. Given that most people – Marxists included – don’t think people should just live on the potatoes and onions they have planted in the back garden, he must be referring to a special quality in “commodities” that separate them from consumer goods. But more of that shortly.  

Kliman’s firm belief is that, in a capitalist society, institutional forms don’t matter. However hard they try not to, everyone has to swim with the current. In this, I think he is partly right. Non-shareholder enterprises do, I believe, behave differently, but not differently enough. In Britain, for example, you can see a glaring disparity in the way consumers are treated. The traditional shareholder-owned companies dominant in energy and water provision since privatisation in the 1980s, have engaged in crass profiteering. Electricity prices have shot up by 120% and gas prices by 190% in the last decade. Welsh Water, by contrast, which has been run as a social enterprise without shareholders since 2001, has reduced bills every year for seven years. The nationalised Scottish Water, is into its fourth year of a price freeze. Railways in the UK paint a similar picture. Private train companies have, in the context of burgeoning taxpayer subsidy, made an enormous return of 147% for every pound invested, but when the state is inadvertently put in charge of a rail-line, the taxpayer subsidy miraculously drops. The British National Health Service, in its heyday, exemplified the primacy of need over the bottom line.

Gar Alperovitz in America Beyond Capitalism, argues that the price advantage displayed by municipally-owned electricity utilities in the US “is due to the fact of public ownership itself; locally controlled public utilities often can be especially responsive to customers' needs and do not need to pay dividends to private shareholders.”

However, all these instances occur in cases of non-competitive monopolies or without direct competition for market share. When competing in a market against shareholder-owned competitors, social or state-owned or worker-controlled enterprises have much less freedom. The record of the famed worker cooperative corporation in Mondragon in Northern Spain, illustrates both how worker-run coops are an advance on the capitalist model, but also, in important respects, ape it. In Mondragon, we have, not an isolated divergence from capitalism, but Spain’s seventh largest company. Mondragon comprises 256 businesses that generate $4.8 billion a year in manufacturing, retail and distribution. It boasts 43 schools, one university and more than 80,000 employees.

As this analysis demonstrates, in stark contrast to the towering edifices of economic dictatorship and inequality that surround us, Mondragon is a beacon of democracy and egalitarianism. It operates on a one worker one vote basis, and each worker’s vote in the Mondragon general assembly, controlling production, income distribution and the election of the board, carries the same weight. The Mondragon CEO earns only nine times the federation’s lowest paid employee. Economic downturns are not met with automatic lay-offs. Mondragon members are more likely to vote for pay decreases in order to spare unemployment.

“In contrast to most capitalist companies, whereby the measure of a successful company is almost always based on maximum profitability, the cooperative approach offers an alternative that supports democracy through an egalitarian voting system, while at the same time promoting job security for worker-members, social justice and community responsibility,” say authors from the Center for Social Epidemiology, of Mondragon.

But this is not the whole story. While Mondragon embodies these undoubted advances, it has also expanded into other countries – Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Argentina, Thailand and China, for example –  in much the same way that a capitalist company might and, significantly, its international workforce have not been offered cooperative membership. Roughly a third of Mondragon’s workers are not members of the coop. And, after trying in 1960s to adopt alternative manufacturing processes, Mondragon now incorporates familiar capitalist practices such as just in time inventory and shift work.

What this indicates, I think, is that it is very difficult to make worker cooperatives universal – to expand them without ensuring, at the same time, that a sizeable chunk of the population remains outside them. And also that cooperatives will inevitably respond to outside competition. There is no way to ensure that even a worker’s coop that is an exemplar of internal democracy will not vote to gain an edge through the introduction of ultra-competitive practices, thus compelling other cooperatives to follow suit, to grow or die.

Kliman would say that these inescapable flaws mean you have to “do away with” capitalism and markets, or, alternatively, that capitalism, the process of adding value through the sale of products, inevitably entails markets and you cannot have one without the other. That is what he means by commodities, the selling of products and the reinvestment of the profit made through that sale, as opposed to the neutral designation, ‘consumer goods’. But lesson of 20th history seems to indicate that you can’t abolish capitalism and markets, without entering a nightmare realm of central planning and total state domination. Kliman refers to the “horrors of state-capitalism that called itself ‘communism’” so he clearly doesn’t want to go back to that. He also says “we have to work out how we can have a modern society that operates without the laws of capitalist production being in control”. By “modern society” he seems to mean a society with a myriad of consumer goods and conveniences but lacking the compulsion or necessity to make a profit from these goods; to turn them into commodities. Is this an impossible dream? Is economic democracy within some form of regulated market, the best we can hope for? Can you really abolish capitalism? I would like to consider these questions at some point when I have the time.


Thursday, 9 January 2014

When Marxists disagree


From outside, Marxism can appear an ideological monolith. Workers, so the story traditionally goes, involuntarily supply their employers with surplus value and watch as the capitalists’ wealth exponentially increases, while they themselves get poorer. Through some combination of the working class overcoming their false consciousness and getting wise to the real situation and the unavoidable instability and crisis-prone nature of the capitalist economic system, the crunch will come, revolution will result and everyone will live happily ever after now that class distinctions have been abolished. Amen.

The truth is more complicated. Marxian economics - and it is economics that Marx was fundamentally concerned with - is a much more contested field that you would imagine. Two recent books by American Marxists, The Endless Crisis by John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney and Andrew Kliman’s The Failure of Capitalist Production illustrate the dissension.

At stake is what causes economic crisis, more importantly, this economic crisis. Is it a growing gap, as Bellamy Foster and McChesney maintain, between the endless production of goods and services and workers’ finite ability to consume them, leading to stagnation? Or, as Kliman says, the decline in the rate of capitalists’ profit, leading to stagnation (alright, they do agree on some things).

Monopoly capitalism

We live, say The Endless Crisis authors, in a society dominated by very large monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations, a trend which is only exacerbating through constant mergers and acquisitions. The power of these giant corporations means they are able to extract more and more profit (or in Marx-speak, surplus) from their workforce; profit that needs an outlet and can’t all be absorbed by the consumption of wealthy investors. The trouble is demand can’t keep up; the value of real wages in the US is lower than it was in the 1970s. The result is slow growth and unused capacity – one-third of the capacity of the US automobile industry was unused in the run-up to the Great Recession, for example.

In these circumstances, speculative finance becomes irresistibly alluring, as the only way to effectively deploy all the money that is being made. The portion of US national income devoted to finance, real estate and insurance, say Bellamy Foster and McChesney, has risen from 35% in the early 1980s to over 90% now. But the escape promised by financial baubles like mortgage backed securities or credit default swaps is illusory because they make crashes, like the one in 2008, far more likely.

And the promised escape is actually a trap because, once a crash has happened, the political authorities can think of nothing but reinstalling the old casino economy because they regard the ‘real economy’ as irretrievably stagnant. Think of the UK economic recovery, based on near zero interest rates and rising house prices. “Rather than overcoming the stagnation problem,” write The Endless Crisis authors, “this renewed financialization will only serve at best to put off the problem, while piling on further contradictions, setting the stage for even bigger shocks in the future.”

What does stagnation mean? It means lower wages, stalled careers, unemployment and under-employment, lack of social mobility and periodic economic instability. The authors quote older economists Paul Sweezy and Henry Magdoff, who, writing in the late ‘80s, reflected on their formative experiences of fifty years before: “For us economic stagnation in its most agonizing and pervasive form, including its far-reaching ramifications in every aspects of social life, was an overwhelming personal experience” But this is not the same for people who grew up after the Second World War. “Under these circumstances,” they wrote, “they find it hard to relate to what they are likely to regard as our obsession with the problem of stagnation. They are not quite sure what we are talking about or what all the fuss is over. There is a temptation to say: just wait and see, you’ll find out soon enough.” We are now finding out.

Not quite recession

In one way, Andrew Kliman doesn’t disagree with this prognosis. He, too, thinks we live in a “new normal of not quite recession” and the future of the economy is likely to be stagnation, interrupted by crashes. But, in another, he disagrees profoundly. For he traces the problems back to a completely different source, a fall in the rate of profit. To Kliman, problems of “effective demand” (the expression is from Keynes) are a red herring. Demand hasn’t fallen and, even if it had, it wouldn’t matter. This is a complete reversal of standard left-wing economic thinking which says that companies are compelled by competition to introduce new technologies and cut costs, thus precipitating an ever-widening gap between supply and demand.

It’s fair to say Karl Marx’s theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is commonly thought of, if it is thought of at all, as a historical curiosity. Or just plain wrong. Many Marxist and radical economists were convinced that the Japanese economist, Nobuo Okishio, had proved its falsity in 1961. Needless to say, Kliman says he did no such thing.

This is how the theory goes. Marx said that all value is created by labour. But as mechanisation proceeds and edges out work performed by people, value or profit decreases. Eventually this fall in the rate of profit causes a crisis. If – and this is the important part – the destruction of capital value caused by this crisis through bankruptcies, companies going bust and unemployment, is allowed to happen unimpeded, the whole process can begin afresh. It becomes much cheaper to buy companies and rate of return on profit resumes at a new peak. A new boom ensues.

Even if they don’t explicitly reject the theory, many Marxists say profit isn’t falling. The Endless Crisis authors say that the rate of profit fell during the nineteenth century under conditions of competitive capitalism but it has risen since as monopolistic corporations have ruled the roost. Indeed the rising amount of profit or surplus is a prime reason for the crisis because it is diverted into speculation, having nowhere else to go. Probably the most famous contemporary Marxist, Richard Wolff, says profit has gone wild in the US as a result of falling wages.

Capitalism hasn’t changed

Kliman says this is all mistaken. “Capitalism has changed far less than many people – its critics as well as its supporters – want to think,” he writes. The rate of profit has fallen, though this has been masked, initially by inflation and then by the fact that economists used the wrong measure of profit. Kliman says radical economists, for some reason, measure profit by what it costs to replace machinery as opposed to the more common sense method of judging the rate of return on advanced capital.

Not since the Great Depression of the 1930s, says Kliman, has there been a free market response to an economic downturn. Every subsequent downturn has been washed away with government subsidies and debt guarantees. This ensures that the downturns have not been half as severe as they otherwise might have been but also that there could be no resultant boom because capital value was not destroyed. The US economy, he says, has never properly recovered from the recession of 1974. And because of this the rate of profit has continued to fall, and is reflected, in a delayed fashion, in increased debt and financial speculation.

Kliman’s explanation does differ profoundly from what he calls the “conventional Left account” and, rather than rejecting it or accepting it in toto, I think it needs some interrogating. I think the most important questions are:

Firstly, Kliman uses a method of measuring the rate profit – the rate of return on advanced capital – which he says is meaningful to most people and to business itself. Given that, a discernable decline in the rate of the profit should have been a major concern of business over the past thirty years or so and hotly debated in the business press. I’m not aware of this, so why hasn’t it happened?

Secondly, Kliman says that in order for a fall in the rate of profit to be actualised, prices have to fall. But inflation has been the norm at least since the Second World War. The only area of decreasing prices for Western consumers I’m aware of, is in the realm of cheaper clothes and the reason for that is super-exploitation of garment workers in countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam, not mechanisation. And mechanisation, according to the theory, has to occur in order for prices to fall and the rate of profit to drop.

Thirdly, I don’t believe demand is so irrelevant to capitalist economic health as Kliman says. Kliman is a dyed in the wool demand-sceptic. He claims the post-World War Two boom was not due to pent-up consumer demand or government stimulus but to a resumption in a high rate of profit. But why did this reinvigorated rate of profit not kick in in the late ‘30s, when the US slipped back into recession as government stimulus was temporarily withdrawn? The pre-conditions of a new boom were present, as capital value had been destroyed utterly in the downturn of the early ‘30s. So why did it take the Second World War to put the Great Depression out of everyone’s misery?

Kliman maintains that the final consumer is not as important to capitalist economic health as most radical economists think. Businesses can and do sell to other businesses and investment spending has risen much more markedly than consumption spending in the US, over the last 75 years. That is why the economy grows at all. He is also at pains to point out that only with a very selective use of statistics, can you demonstrate that real wages have fallen in the US since the 1970s. Using another method of calculating inflation, Kliman says, wages have risen markedly. And if you measure total compensation, including employer social security and medicare contributions, they show an unmistakable rise.

It is widely accepted, certainly not just by the left-wingers or Keynesians, that consumer spending supplies an integral part of economic growth, nearly two-thirds of economic activity in the UK. And it is indisputable that real wages are falling now - by an eye-watering 8.5% in Britain since 2009, according the state Office for National Statistics. At the same time, consumption is forming a large part of the headline rise in GDP, an increase that, in the absence of wage increases, can only come from savings or borrowing. Thus, I think you can safely conclude that consumer spending is vital for economic health and an important component of the profits of the financial sector. Consumer demand is, at the very least, part of the story.

You can’t buck the market

But, in spite of these reservations, I do think Kliman’s insights are valuable, because he has realised something that many Left Keynesians and Marxists don’t want to face up to. Namely, that capitalism depends for its vitality on periodic destructiveness and, in this sense, you can’t buck the market. Keynesianism was predicated upon ending this instability but failed, as shown by the large-scale recession that occurred in the mid-1970s. There is a fascinating table on page 53 of Kliman’s book that gives GDP statistics for all regions of the world. It shows that economic growth was higher in every single region of the globe between 1950 and 1973 than it was between 1973 and 2008. In many places, after 1973, growth fell like a stone. Post-1973, the growth rate in Japan, Europe, Latin America and Africa plunged by more than half. Yes, you can say post-war reconstruction petered out, but a seismic economic jolt clearly occurred in the 1970s, which no amount of neoliberalism, declaring war on organised labour, exponentially increasing credit or providing government support to failing financial institutions, has been able to correct. As Kliman points out, all of our current economic malaises – slow growth, slowly rising wages, spiralling inequality, financial instability and debt crises – date from the 1970s, not the 1980s. In other words, from before the neoliberal era and the supremacy of Thatcher and Reagan.

In this acceptance that capitalism’s problems stem ultimately from the 1970s and that Keynesianism, despite the hype, could not overcome the internal dynamics of capitalism, Kliman has an equivalent in Britain, the economist Harry Shutt. Shutt isn’t a Marxist and doesn’t believe that falling profit is to blame, rather he traces the malaise to the need to find investment outlets for an ever increasing volume of funds (a ‘wall of money’) and a decline, in the digital age, in the demand for large-scale capital investment. Nevertheless Shutt, too, thinks that governments attempts to evade recurrent system crashes by intervening with subsidies and debt guarantees, have only resulted in insipid growth, more instability, spiralling debt and a “postponing of the evil day”. To him, Keynesianism is the problem, not the solution. As with Kliman, Shutt thinks that the corporate debt overhang is too great to permit sustainable growth. Artificial stimulation, from the outside, can’t work.

The intractable problem is that a fervent desire to avoid a fully-played out crash of capitalism is not limited to ruling elites or policymakers. Ordinary people are now are locked in to the success of the system, not just through their jobs but through pension funds invested on the stock market. Nobody wants a crash and the perception that, in Shutt’s words, “preserving the status quo was an end that could justify almost any means” is not confined to the summit of society. If there is another crash coming – and the feeling of The Endless Crisis authors and Kliman is that it’s inevitable – then it’s a sure-fire bet that governments will attempt to quench it with public money. If it proves too big for that then all bets are off as to what will ensue.

The lesson of his analysis, according to Kliman, is that new regulations or laws cannot break with the laws of capitalist production. A “somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment” as Keynes called for, won’t change the fact that banks still have to exist in a capitalist economy. “Investment decisions cannot be based on what would enhance workers’ well-being or fulfilment of public policy objectives,” writes Kliman. “… a bank that dared to pursue these goals would soon find that lenders and investors would not supply it with the funds it needed.”

The pessimistic conclusion, although Kliman would describe it as sober and realistic, is that institutional structures don’t matter. Neither enterprises controlled by their workers or state enterprises represent a rupture with the laws of capitalism and will just reproduce its flaws. In order to transcend those flaws, you need a society governed by new methods of production and exchange. Yet, workers’ control, or worker self-directed enterprises, is thought of by growing numbers of people as a cure for capitalism. It is to this debate that I want to turn to, next.

Tuesday, 24 December 2013

Twenty-something things they don't tell you about our glorious economic system, part one


I realise I haven’t posted for a while. I’m currently engulfed in reviewing two books on Marxian economics, The Endless Crisis and The Failure of Capitalist Production – which is a bit of a challenge. In the meantime, I thought that, as this blog was originally intended to review books about capitalism in an in-depth way, I’d share some counter-intuitive and little known facts I’ve encountered along the way.


 1 Between 1980 and 2007 the global labour force grew from 1.9 billion to 3.1 billion, a rise of 63%. 73% of the labour force is located in the developing world and 40% in China and India alone. This has happened primarily because of ‘depeasantisation’ – peasants leave or are forced to leave the land and urban slums expand dramatically. 46 million workers join the labour force, across the world, every year.

2 In every region of the world, economic growth was higher between 1950 and 1973 than between 1973 and 2008. Growth more than halved in Western Europe, Latin America and Africa. Overall world growth stood at 2.9% between 1950 and 1973 and 1.8% between 1973 and 2008. (This data is gleaned from a table on page 53 of Andrew Kliman's The Failure of Capitalist Production)

3 Due to the expansion of credit, in the four years before the financial crisis (2003-2007), global growth averaged 4-5%, higher than at any time since the 1960s.

4 The 2008 crash was the second largest economic crisis in history, after the Great Depression of the 1930s. Without government bail-outs and stimulus, it would have been the largest.


6 7-8% of the labour force in Brazil and 9% of the labour force in Egypt are employed as domestic servants. In England and Wales it is 0.3%. 30-50% of the non-agricultural workforce is self-employed in developing countries, in developed countries it is 12.8%. But as proletarianisation is increasing in the developing world (see point one) and self-employment increasing in the developed world, this balance will likely change.

7  35% of the workforce in Britain in the early 1970s worked in manufacturing. Now it is just over 10%.

8 0.1% of the Chinese and Indian populations are thought to be psychopaths. In Britain and America it is between 2 and 4%. 


10  Life expectancy for civilians increased in Britain by twice as much during the First and Second World Wars, as it did during the rest of the twentieth century.

11 Trade union membership peaked in Britain at 13.5 million in 1979. By 2009, it was down to 6.7m.

12 Had the share of GDP going to wages in the 1970s been maintained, UK consumers would currently have an extra £100 billion at their disposal, and US consumers £500 billion.