Chasing Unicorns? Orwell, socialism and patriotism

“England has got to be true to herself”, a famous English socialist once wrote. “She is not being true to herself while the refugees who have sought our shores are penned up in concentration camps, and company directors work out subtle schemes to dodge their Excess Profits Tax”.

George Orwell typed these words in 1940, in the middle of the Blitz as German bombs were raining down. His short book, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius, has subsequently become the ur-text of a patriotic vision of socialism. Corbynism, it is claimed, fatally lacked this essential ingredient of popularity – indeed stamping on any tendencies in this direction. This was a major reason why it crashed and burnt in the 2019 election. Socialism still – in Orwell’s phrase – has not “really touched the heart of the English people”.

Keir Starmer, on the other hand, is determined to avoid such a fate, wrapping the Labour party (literally) in the Union Jack and signalling a deep emotional attachment to the monarchy. He even ordered in his MPs to abstain on a bill authorising the security services to commit murder and torture without legal repercussion – for fear of appearing ‘patriotically’ suspect.

Don’t sing ‘Rule Britannia’

But the interesting thing about The Lion and the Unicorn is that the patriotism it pays homage to is not the same patriotism that the Labour party in 2020 is seeking to identify with. Starmer’s conference speech was trailed to the media as rebranding Labour as the party of “flag, forces and family”. Blue Labour, the Labour faction which heralds ‘conservative socialism’, is committed to the triad of “family, faith and flag”. There is a subtle difference if you look carefully.

However, Orwell explicitly rejects the idea that the patriotism of the English working class revolves around these cornerstones. Its patriotism is “profound” but “the working man’s heart does not leap when he sees a Union Jack”. Rather, there is an ingrained hatred of war, militarism and uniforms, and – outside of war – a widespread refusal to join the army even in times of mass unemployment. “So deep does this feeling go” writes Orwell, “that for a hundred years past the officers of the British Army, in peace time, have always worn civilian clothes when off duty.”

In Orwell’s view, “all the boasting and flag-wagging, the ‘Rule Britannia’ stuff is done by small minorities”.

Of course, The Lion and the Unicorn was written nearly 80 years ago. Attitudes may have changed – witness the ubiquitous uniformed soldiers before kick-off at football matches and the pressure of conformity about poppy wearing. But Orwell made a crucial distinction between nationalism or jingoism and patriotism.

It is a similar story when it comes to religion or ‘faith’ as modern-day adherents like to call it. “The common people” says Orwell, are not puritanical and “without definite religious belief”. Though there is a “deep tinge” of Christian belief, in terms of organised religion, the Anglican Church is mainly the preserve of the landed gentry and the Nonconformist sects only appeal to minorities.

Defining patriotism

So what then is patriotism? According to Orwell, it is a purely defensive attitude and protective of a particular way of life. “It is bound up,” Orwell writes, “with solid breakfasts, gloomy Sundays, smoky towns and winding roads, green fields and red pillar-boxes.”

Mercifully he soon becomes less misty-eyed and then makes an astute point about English culture which, I believe, is still true decades later. The English – despite the contentedly defeatist attitude of much of the liberal-left which sought salvation, oddly, in the neoliberal European Union – are not irredeemably conservative, capitalist or right-wing. This fatalistic stance should have been exploded by the 2017 election in which a left-wing Labour party gained nearly 42% of the vote in England. But there is, Orwell says, a definitive privateness about English life:

The liberty of the individual is still believed in, almost as in the nineteenth century. But this has nothing to do with economic liberty, the right to exploit others for profit. It is the liberty to have a home of your own, to do what you like in your spare time, to choose your own amusements instead of having them chosen for you.

Undeniably, this feeling can be used to fuel a seemingly endless housing boom – rooted in the comfort induced by seeing the value of the house you own continually rising and in viewing your home as a haven against the world. But it can also be – and would be by a serious Left – utilized in the opposite cause. In a country where millions have scant security as private tenants, and are being evicted as we speak, and where wealthy individuals and businesses buy up hundreds of flats and houses for no other purpose than renting them or selling them on, “the liberty to have a home of your own”, but not necessarily one you are free to sell, is the kind of aspiration the Left should champion. In Marxist terms, we live in a world where ‘use value’ (the function of a house or flat to provide security, stability and shelter) has become the slave of ‘exchange value’ (seeing them as simply ‘units’ to make money from). That is why Orwell could proclaim a fervent belief in the ‘liberty of the individual’ but also advocate (in the political programme that accompanies The Lion and the Unicorn) the abolition of private land ownership in urban areas – and see no contradiction between the two.

Orwell the Red

Indeed, what is striking about Orwell ‘patriotic socialism’ is that the socialism involved is of the deepest red. The second half of The Lion and the Unicorn is devoted to espousing an “English Revolution” that would set free “the native genius of the English people”. Railways, banks, major industries and land would all be nationalised (Orwell recommends allowing private ownership of land of up to 15 acres in rural areas, but as seen above, would completely abolish private land ownership – and thus landlordism – in town areas), incomes would be restricted to a ten to one variation, the House of Lords abolished and private schools flooded with state-aided pupils or simply closed. Orwell even envisages the stock market being torn down!

However, it is interesting that despite Orwell’s intense anti-Communism, his economic beliefs do not seem vastly different in their fundamentals. Orwell defined himself explicitly as a “democratic socialist”, not a Communist, and clearly saw great danger in vesting political power in an all-seeing political party, but in economic terms, did not see any alternative to state socialism.  “From the moment that all productive goods have been declared the property of the State,” he writes, “the common people will feel, as they cannot feel now, that the State, is themselves.” Despite fighting in an anarchist/syndicalist revolution in Spain, and with a Trotskyist battalion, just four years previously Orwell seems to have imbibed none of their critique of state socialism, nor their advocacy – indeed living example of – workers’ control.

Nonetheless, by comparison with Orwellian socialism, Corbyn’s mellow social democracy appears – notwithstanding the hysteria it generated – quite tame. And Blue Labour, which might claim to be the inheritor in the Labour party of the Orwellian vision, seems oblivious to his decrying of the party’s “timid reformism”. In aligning with – at best tolerating – insipid centrist leaders like Starmer and Miliband there is an all too common wilful blindness to Orwell’s radical side.

Ashamed of their own country

But the incongruous thing – and probably a large reason Orwell is claimed by divergent political philosophies – is that he combines a frankly revolutionary socialism with unvarnished contempt for left-wing intellectuals. Orwell berates the “shallow leftism” of intellectuals and the “mechanically anti-British attitude” which was de rigueur on the radical left of the time. Much of the contempt stemmed from widespread left-wing support for Stalin and the Soviet Union. Orwell, by contrast, had seen Stalin’s inherent brutality – and well as his anti-revolutionary stance – at first hand during the Spanish Civil War. However, some of the critique transcends the circumstances of the time. In The Lion and the Unicorn and elsewhere (for example the essay ‘Notes on Nationalism’), Orwell develops the idea of “transferred nationalism” – taking all the emotions, affection and loyalty that might have been attached to your own country and simply directing them somewhere else – the Soviet Union, primarily, in his era. Despite its pretentions, this mental transference gets the protagonist no closer to “genuinely internationalist outlook”.

The same transference was in evidence during the EU referendum campaign and the endless negotiations that followed. Implicit in much of the liberal-left embrace of the Remain cause was the idea that virtually everything that made life bearable in England came from ‘civilised’ European influence, without which the country would descend into a corporate free-loading, racist hell-hole (ironically, in devoting most of their energies to taking down Jeremy Corbyn – and thus helping Boris Johnson – liberal Remainers ensured this vision would come to pass). The idea that a home-grown socialism was even possible was dismissively rejected as a contradiction in terms.

Thus, Europe (the institutions of the EU) became a purely benign endeavour, without conflict or desire, pitted against a country whose temporary, austerity-wreaking rulers (a trait they shared with the EU) were seen as representative of its eternal character. But genuine internationalism involves the recognition that all countries (including pan-governmental entities and repressed or colonised nations), have their own elites and plebeians, their own fractures between capital and labour, their own bigots and mobs, and their own interests which leaders will attempt to pursue.

Orwell, notwithstanding his unabashed patriotism, is aware of this. Thus, in his treatment of India (at the time part of the British Empire) he can recognise both that Britain, out of fear of trade competition and a desire to make rule easier, has artificially held back Indian development and that, partly as a consequence of British domination, the average Indian suffers most keenly at the hands of his fellow-countrymen. “The petty Indian capitalist exploits the town worker with the utmost ruthlessness,” notes Orwell, “the peasant lives from birth to death in the grip of the money-lender”. That kind of analysis seems strangely sophisticated today.

Return of the ‘drowsy years’

However, in one important way, Orwell’s essay is rooted in its own time; a time when Britain (and its Empire) seemed the only obstacle to the total domination of Nazi Germany. He likens Britain to a family with the wrong members in control – the dividend drawers, the landed class, the “functionless” owners of industry – who are holding back the intelligent and capable. The ruling class, in Orwell’s view, are not corrupt so much as “unteachable” and mired in self-deception. While Nazi Germany has the SS man, we have the rent collector.

War, said Orwell, was the greatest of all agents of change. It speeds up long-term processes and brings previously unacknowledged realities to the surface. In the midst of the Blitz, the “drowsy years”, as Orwell encapsulated the 1930s, were well and truly over and it was possible, necessary actually, to become both revolutionary and realistic.

But now the dividend drawers, the owners of industry, the tax evaders are back, if they ever really went away. Rent is the (anti)-lifeblood of the economy. Students are cajoled into returning to halls of residence so that they can pay rent to the owners. The spectre of city centres devoid of commuters petrifies the owners of commercial and residential properties who see their rental streams drying up before their eyes. Hedge fund managers and bankers are exempted from quarantine regulations because of their alleged contribution to the economy. The company directors of Orwell’s time who try and dodge “Excess Profits Tax” have been superseded by a multi-trillion dollar tax avoidance industry orchestrated by banks and green-lighted by governments.

The outright treachery that frightened Orwell has been replaced by ordinary corruption. The reverence for the impartiality of the law even if it is unjust, which Orwell believed characterised England, now pales before the staging of show trials of those who embarrass the rulers of the world. The “right to exploit others for profit” is deemed sacrosanct while a bill allowing MI5 agents to murder British citizens with impunity is waived through the House of Commons with the connivance of the Labour party. The drowsy years are back with a vengeance and nothing seems likely to jolt us back into attentiveness.

Financial crisis: Why and what's the reason for?

There’s an old Bob Dylan song called ‘Who killed Davey Moore?’ It’s the tale of a boxer killed by a fatal punch and the song recounts the protests of those involved – the referee, the crowd, the gambler, his manager and his opponent – that they weren’t the ones really responsible for his death. “It wasn’t me that made him fall,” they all cry. “No, you can’t blame me at all.”

That song springs to mind whenever anyone apportions blame for the 2008 financial crisis. There are no shortage of culprits. And given that the world may experience similar economic tremors in the near future, the question of who is to blame is extremely relevant.

Who really did make the system fall?

Culprit # 1 Senior Bankers

Bankers are, unsurprisingly, the most likely suspects. Adjectives like reckless and greedy have clung to banks like leeches since 2008 (which may be an apt analogy). But according to Dutch author Joris Luyendijk, the fatal flaw was not so much greed as wilful incompetence. The recently released movie The Big Short exemplifies, he says, the atmosphere in run-up to 2008. Days in which extremely clever finance geeks took advantage of the fact that senior managers in most banks had no idea what was really going on in their organisations. The impenetrable financial products they devised combined to make them vast fortunes and lay the seeds for financial meltdown.

Luyendijk quotes former UK Chancellor Alastair Darling who laments the fact that top managers in US and UK banks “failed to understand – or even ask – what was making them so much profit and what were the risks.”

He attributes this failure to lack of personal liability. In the days before the Big Bang, financial firms were organised as partnerships, rather than publicly floated corporations which any person, or hedge fund or other company could buy shares in. Partnerships ensured managers kept an unblinking eye on their organisation’s activities, says Luyendijk, because if things went awry they were personally liable for the cost of mistakes. But when partnerships were taken over by publicly floated banks or the investment divisions of major banks began marketing their own financial products, this discipline was lost.

I believe that while deliberate blindness on the part of senior managers was a factor in the financial crisis, it is far from a complete explanation. Firstly, bank executives were not as unaware as Luyendijk or The Big Short suggest. From pooled mortgages, to Libor and Forex fraud, the idea that senior executives were utterly oblivious to the machinations going on beneath them is not credible. When apologies become necessary, incompetence is always preferred to culpability.

In 2004, it was agreed that banks needed to have capital or deposits worth a mere 8% of the risky loans they had on their books. That agreement, known as Basel II, was “largely written by the banks themselves” says Mark Blyth in his book, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Banks became massively indebted in the early 21^st century (they still are) and that was a conscious decision on the part of senior managers; a way of securing more profit by increasing the amount of money they loaned out. European banks, especially, became chronically ‘over-leveraged’ and may yet have to be recapitalised ‘on a scale yet unimagined’. To blame all this on unruly traders is way too convenient.

Second, the financial crisis was not just about the risk-laden products, the famous mortgage backed securities, collaterized debt obligations and credit default swaps, that boomeranged on the institutions that devised them. It spread across the world with such devastating effect because other institutions – other banks, companies, governments and NGOs – bought those toxic assets. And they bought them because they seem to embody the irresistible combination of low risk and high yield.

Lastly, risk-taking by banks was not merely an internal transgression. They were subject to pressure, possibly decisive pressure, from outside …

Culprit # 2 Shareholders

“In the run-up to the financial crisis, shareholders failed to control risk-taking in banks,” concluded the UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, “and indeed were criticising some [directors] for excessive conservatism. Some bank leaderships resisted this pressure, but others did not.”

So it wasn’t just that senior executives in banks failed to control super-intelligent and ambitious underlings who could reel off all the prime numbers up to 100 in 2.5 seconds. As directors of publicly floated companies, they were also under constant pressure to deliver greater and greater profits for the owners, the shareholders. And aware that if they didn’t succeed, they needed to look elsewhere for regular remuneration. In the words of Citigroup chief exec Charles O Prince in 2007, (in an article written by Luyendijk) “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”

To whose tune were the senior bank managers dancing? Other banks, primarily. Financial behemoths like Barclays, JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank top a list of 147 multinationals who literally own each other through interlocking shareholding. Other major shareholders include hedge funds, fantastically wealthy individuals and pension funds.

What these owners have in common is a need to maximise yield. According to Paul Mason, economics editor of Channel 4 News, big institutional investors such as pension funds, in their pressing need for higher returns on their investments, have become “crucial drivers of instability”. The signature products of the 2008 crisis, mortgage backed securities and collaterized debt obligations, seemed, before they exploded, low risk. So major shareholders were happy to buy them and to breezily criticise banks for ‘excessive conservatism’.

What lies at the root of this predilection for risk-taking among shareholders is the same weakness that Luyendijk criticises bank executives for – that if things go drastically wrong, they know they won’t be accountable. Just as bank executives are cushioned by a lack of personal liability, so shareholders enjoy the protection of limited liability.

Limited liability means that shareholders can lose only their investment in a company; they are never on the hook for the entirety of its bad debts. It is a right granted by the state. Limited liability first originated in Britain in the 1850s and was opposed in an earlier time by the father of market economics, Adam Smith, because of the dangers he saw in separating ownership and management.

The situation is complicated by the fact that, while shareholders seem very adept at pressurising the managers of the corporations they own to maximise profit without heed to public welfare, they are positively impotent when it comes to reining in harmful behaviour. Senior managers seem able to set their own pay which has mushroomed to 180 times that of the average worker in Britain. When shareholders do revolt over excessive executive pay – as they did at Shell in 2009 - they find that their opinion is merely advisory. In many ways, the senior management of large, shareholder-owned corporations are a law unto themselves.

So some have concluded that protecting the public from the selfishness of corporations requires removing both the limited liability of shareholders and the personal liability of company directors. “The most effective way of curbing predatory practices is to withdraw limited liability and hold the shareholders and directors of these enterprises personally liable,” argues Essex University’s Professor of Accounting, Prem Sikka.

Sikka wants alternatives to the corporate model – mutuals, cooperatives, not for profit and worker owned enterprises – to thrive and be promoted by government. “All are subjected to community pressures and control by employees, savers and consumers,” he says. “They see something beyond making a fast buck.”

The trouble is, during the crisis of 2008/9, the eyesight of these supposedly alternative enterprises seemed as myopic as anyone else’s.

Culprit # 3 the global market

The list of mutuals in Britain felled by the financial crisis is embarrassingly long. The Dunfermline Building Society, the Scarborough Building Society, the Chesham Building Society, the Derbyshire Building Society and the Cheshire Building Society all either collapsed or had to be bought by other financial institutions. In the case of the Dunfermline, the Bank of England bailed it out and ran it for a time.

Building societies don’t have shareholders. They are owned by, and in theory accountable to, their members – people who have mortgages or savings with them. But, though they didn’t create the banks’ financial ‘weapons of mass destruction’, they were just as reckless with the way they lent money.

In May last year, regulator Andrew Bailey, the chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority, warned building societies that they must not return to the ‘fatal’, high risk lending that helped trigger the financial crisis. He cited evidence that building societies were resuming the pre-crisis practice of making loans many times larger than their customers’ income and property.

These failings are not limited to Britain. In 2009 two of Germany’s famous state-owned Landesbanken, were forced to merge after they had borrowed too much capital and invested it in toxic US sub-prime mortgage assets. Four others had to be bailed out by state governments in Germany to the tune of millions of euros.

In Spain, savings banks, known as cajas de ahorros, are owned by non-profit foundations and dedicated to charitable activities as well as savings and mortgages. But they were at the heart of the implosion of Spain’s housing bubble. Of 45 cajas in existence at the start of the crisis in 2007, only two survived. The rest collapsed and had to be taken over by banks or the government. The effects have been catastrophic. Hundreds of Spaniards have been evicted every single day and the unemployment rate has reached a staggering 25%.

The financial crisis may have been hatched in corporate-land but it unfolded like a virus throughout the world because of markets. And allegedly alternative enterprises were as starry-eyed about these markets as anybody else.

Why then did alternative enterprises, which presented themselves as different to soulless, money-grubbing corporations, turn out to be not so different after all? Partly, because of a lack of real accountability. Though they were accountable in theory, they weren’t in practice. German Landesbanken had advisory boards that were meant to keep senior management in check but merely rubber-stamped their activities. In Britain, the Cooperative Bank’s woes can be attributed to the fact that its elected board didn’t have the knowledge or confidence to challenge the ‘incredibly optimistic’ assumptions of the management team. In this sense, the corporate and mutual sectors suffer from a similar affliction – out of control senior executives.

We don’t live in democratic societies. People don’t have the knowledge, time or inclination to hold the powerful to account. Without a conscious change in that level of knowledge and intention, mechanisms of accountability will remain empty shells.

But perhaps the problem is deeper still. The Marxist economist Andrew Kliman argues it is foolhardy, in a capitalist economy, to expect nationalised or worker controlled banks to behave differently to their corporate equivalents. “In order to survive, a state-run (or worker-run) bank must pursue the goal of profit maximisation, just like every other bank,” he says. “As long as there is capital, what are actually in control are the economic laws of capitalism.”

Those economic laws of capitalism mandated that building societies and other mutuals compete with major banks for market share and profitability. And doubtless many members, at the time, agreed with these aims. Governments in Britain have since the 1980s relied on rising house prices to ensure re-election. When that measure goes into reverse, as it did for the Conservatives in the early ‘90s, they watch as erstwhile supporters desert them in droves. Pensions funds are a ‘crucial driver of instability’, yet many millions rely on them to deliver high investment returns to fund their pensions.

This is not to descend into the ethical void and assume that everyone is equally guilty. Some people are infinitely more culpable than others. A tiny elite get to set their own pay. A tiny elite have been bailed-out by government and their wealth rescued by state action. A tiny elite get to make – and rig – the rules of the game. But, as in Dylan’s Davey Moore parable, it is the rules of the game that need altering. The blame game confers only an ephemeral pleasure. A bit like shopping.

How about some 'market non-conforming democracy' Angela Merkel?

If the yes votes wins Sunday’s Greek referendum and Syriza falls, “too many will believe”, fretted the Guardian’s columnist in chief, Jonathan Freedland on Saturday, that Brussels and Berlin engineered the toppling of a democratically elected government.

I wonder where they could have picked up that delusionary belief?

It clearly can’t have come from the senior German conservative politician, described as “one of Europe’s most influential politicians” who told the Times newspaper  last week that Angela Merkel’s CDU would block any deal with the ‘communists’ Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis, campaign vociferously for a ‘yes’ vote, and then install a ‘technical’ government in Syriza’s place.

Revelations from Martin Schulz, German social democrat (!) and President of the European Parliament, to the effect he wanted to Syriza to resign and be replaced with a “technocratic government so we can continue to negotiate” obviously had no effect.

But, perhaps, you know, “too many” have just been paying attention to the record of Eurozone institutions and core country governments like Germany’s since the beginning of the financial crisis. A record that betrays an unbending desire to topple recalcitrant governments and views the will of the people as a minor impediment to which no credence should be given.

Let’s have a brief refresh

Ireland, February 2011

On the eve on the Irish general election in February 2011, the European Commission helpfully intervened to point out that the result would have absolutely no effect on the country’s IMF-EU bail-out conditions, imposed after the financial sector imploded and its enormous bad debts were transferred to the state. It could not be renegotiated as it was “between the EU and the Republic of Ireland, it's not an agreement between an institution and a particular government,” the Commission said.

The Irish government, it emerged last month, was strong-armed by European Commission into agreeing the 2010 bail-out in the first place, and also to accepting that ‘senior bondholders’ such as large banks, should not share any losses. The ex-General Secretary of the Irish government’s Finance Department, told an inquiry into the causes of the financial crisis in June that the European Commission applied enormous pressure through “misinformation” and “anonymous media briefings” so that Ireland swiftly agreed to the €85 billion IMF-EU bail-out.

All this was quite in keeping with the views expressed in May 2011 by now European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, that fiscal policy was “too important” for voters to have any say over, and should be determined in “dark, secret debates”.

But, you can say that, technically speaking, Eurozone institutions were not toppling governments, just telling them what to do.

Hang on a minute …

Portugal, April 2011

After months of Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates refusing to accept a bail-out, the European Central Bank (ECB) intervened for the sake of the banks (sorry Eurozone). In April 2011, Portuguese banks decided to stop buying government bonds if Lisbon did not seek a rescue. The head of the country’s banking association admitted that he had been given “clear instructions” from the ECB and Bank of Portugal to cut off the tap.

During the ensuing general election campaign, ECB and European Commission experts demanded that all parties sign an accord agreeing to the bail-out memorandum. Before the election, that is. “Let's not have a public dialogue every day,” said EU economy commissioner, Olli Rehn. Portugal has since been lauded by the London School of Economics for establishing consensus over implementing austerity. Well done.

Moving swiftly on …

Greece, November 2011

You could be forgiven for thinking the Eurozone’s current travails with Alexis Tsipras and co were the first time a Greek Prime Minister had thought of holding a referendum on bail-out conditions. But back in November 2011, Prime Minister Georges Papandreou (of the centre-left Pasok party, currently riding high at about 3% in the polls), announced a referendum on whether to remain in the euro and accept the then austerity measures being proposed. But before it could happen he was called in for a swift re-education session with Angela Merkel, then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the ubiquitous Jean-Claude Juncker, then European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and the IMF’s Christine Lagarde. “We made Papandreou ... aware of the fact that his behavior is disloyal,” said Juncker.

But they didn’t stop there. In the words of the Financial Times journalist, Peter Spiegel: “Mr Barroso had called Mr Samaras, the Greek opposition leader, from his hotel before the meeting. He knew Mr Samaras was desperate to avoid the referendum. Mr Samaras told Mr Barroso he was now willing to sign on to a national unity government between his New Democracy party and Pasok – something he had assiduously avoided for months in the hopes he could secure the premiership on his own. Mr Barroso summoned his cabinet and other commission staff to his suite… to plot strategy. He decided he would not tell Mr Sarkozy or Ms Merkel of the conversation but according to people in the room, they began discussing names of possible technocrats to take over from Mr Papandreou in a national unity government. The first person to come to Mr Barroso’s lips was Lucas Papademos, the Greek economist who had left his post as vice-president of the ECB a year earlier. Within a week, Mr Papademos would have the job.”

Technocrats, engineered to take over from elected politicians, who’d have thought it?

Last but not least:

Italy, November 2011

Alright, this one involves Silvio Berlusconi, who you could say, deserved it, but the point still holds. If the EU could remove an obstructive right-wing politician, they would have no qualms about doing so in the case of a left-wing government - like Syriza.

According to a 2014 book by former US Treasury secretary, Timothy Geitner, he was approached by EU officials in November 2011 with a plan to overthrow Berlusconi. The idea was that the US would refuse to back IMF loans to Italy as long as Berlusconi remained in power. Geitner didn’t oblige but the plotting didn’t stop there.

According Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, Italy’s former member on the European Central Banks’s executive board, the EU decided to remove Berlusconi and replace him with former European Commissioner, Mario Monti, because he started threatening in private meetings to ditch the euro and bring back Italy’s former currency, the Lira.

What did definitely happen was that the interest rate on Italian government bonds rocketed in the autumn of 2011 and Berlusconi resigned on 9 November. He was replaced by Monti, who announced an austerity programme and the interest rate miraculously plummeted.

Greece, 2015?

The difference now is that the current Greek government is not prepared to accept ‘dark, secret debates’ or hotel room coups and won’t go quietly into the night. With a ‘no’ vote in Sunday’s referendum, Angela Merkel’s guiding philosophy of ‘market conforming democracy’ is threatening to turn into, heaven forfend, market non-conforming democracy.

And they are really, really asking for it …

Vote Oxo cube