Expert Fascists: The Untold Story of the Spirit of Our Age

“History is a nightmare from which I am trying to escape,” someone said once. In the case of austerity, the nightmare has lasted for more than a century and the alarm isn’t about to jolt us into reality. “Outside, perhaps, of the less than three booming decades that followed World War II," Clara E Mattei notes soberingly in the introduction of her fine book The Capital Order, “austerity has been a mainstay of modern capitalism”.

Even the words are the same. In 1920, upholding the urgent need for countries to “pay their way” through spending cuts and individual abstinence, Lord Robert Chalmers, former permanent secretary at the Treasury, warned of the necessity of “painful” choices. In 2024, as an autumn budget featuring spending cuts of £1bn per department and tax rises looms, Sir Kier Starmer, PM of something called the ‘Labour’ party, has told us to steel ourselves for the “painful” decisions that must be made.

And just as in the 1920s, the promised sunlit uplands – the better times which this perpetual medicine is supposed to give way to – never appear. We must, says Starmer, “accept short-term pain for long-term good”. But we have been hearing that message for 14 years. Britain has been subject to austerity – of the fiscal kind – since 2010. And we (or the governing classes) are still making the same mistake. Maybe, as Mattei suggests, it’s not a mistake.

The Capital Order is about the origins of the creed of austerity. In the aftermath of the First World War, when the public wanted a “land fit for heroes” and the workers’ movement was on the march after decades of subservience, the wise, grey men in the shadows of power realised that something had to be done. The pressure of “excessive” demands on government had to be eased and workers, who were not only pressing for wage rises but questioning the immutability of the rule of capitalists over industry (‘the capital order’ of the book’s title), needed to know their place again.

Without drastic change and a remoulding of public opinion, the result would be ‘socialism’ or, in the worst nightmare of all, workers’ control and Bolshevism.

In Britain, the spirit of the age was trending in this catastrophic direction. Strikes were rampant and ‘reconstructionists’ from the elite, inspired by what had been possible during the war after laissez-faire had been discarded, were hatching plans for a free national health service and huge house-building programme (financed in part by local councils through non-profit making building guilds). It is fascinating to discover that the bulk of the reforming programme of the Attlee government after the Second World War was actually drafted in 1918-20 before being brutally scotched.

In Italy, as Mattei elucidates, things were even more serious. The workers’ movement was reaching the peak of its power – factories were seized and occupied during the long hot summer of 1920. The government stood by, helpless, and revolution seemed just a matter of time.

But at this point in both countries economists and bankers decisively entered the stage of history. On their advice, politicians implemented ruthless austerity. In Britain, savage spending cuts (the ‘Geddes Axe’) were forced through, and a policy of high interest rates, which caused a recession and mass unemployment, imposed in the face of protests. By 1922, wage levels were a third of what they had been in 1920, and 20% cuts in government spending were forced through. Confronted with the situation, workers went into survival mode and the strike wave evaporated.

The Italian ‘solution’ was even more extreme – Fascism. Mussolini marched on Rome and the supine Parliament granted full powers to his minister of finance, the liberal economist Alberto de Stefani, and his team of mainly non-Fascist advisors.  Free to follow their hearts’ desires, they implemented drastic reductions in welfare spending, abolished short-lived experiments in progressive taxation on the rich and corporations, and privatised state-run enterprises such as telecommunications. Coupled with Mussolini’s brutal physical destruction of the Left and workers’ organizations, the economy was pacified and profit-making made a safe endeavour again – though at the cost of wage levels, which sank like a stone, and political and economic freedom.

I must quibble here with the subtitle of the book – How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism. In Italy, they didn’t pave the way to Fascism; they were Fascism.

But regardless, what Mattei has done here is a wonderful example of historical revisionism (which is usually tainted by being associated with holocaust denial). It tells you things you very likely did not know and corrects the oversights of the historical ‘canon’ – a narrative which views the 1920s as a well-meaning period blind to the pain to come as a result of the Great Depression and the “low, dishonest decade” to follow. This book changes the way you view the past and thus the present.

Based on the experience of the last decade or so in Britain and Europe, most people tend to view austerity in terms of budget cuts and (regressive) tax rises. But, as Mattei points out, this is just one prong of the “austerity trinity”.

Fiscal austerity (1) is often accompanied by (2) monetary austerity which entails large rises in interest rates – the cost of holding debt – ostensibly to combat inflation but at the cost of driving the economy into recession. In the 1920s, this was known as the “dear money” policy – “the queen of all austerity policies in Britain” according to Mattei.  Dear Money was inaugurated in 1921 (when interest rates were raised to 7%) and lasted for more than a decade. It was still the official response to the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and predictably only made things worse. But the most brutal example of monetary austerity in the West took place at the beginning of the 1980s on both sides of the Atlantic, when interest rates were hiked to above 17%. The result was recession, mass unemployment (reaching 4 million for a decade in Britain), and the taming of organized labour. Again these results were not an unfortunate mistake. And the lady wasn’t for turning.

The last leg of austerity is (3) industrial austerity, which involves privatisation and crushing organized labour and the right to strike. Both, as Mattei details, were an integral part of Fascist austerity in 1920s’ Italy which literally destroyed (physically) the workers’ movement, enshrining a period of ‘industrial peace’. Industrial austerity was zealously resuscitated by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s leading to a world-wide revolution in economic ‘common sense’, shaping the economic landscape we now take for granted. Nowadays in Europe, if you displease the economic overlords of the European Central Bank, you will be compelled to swallow the medicine of both fiscal and industrial austerity – budget cuts, privatisation, and laws against striking.

But if the economic history of the 20^th and 21^st century has, in the main, been one of austerity, the three horsemen of the austerity trinity have not always been paraded at the same time. Depending on the circumstances, different aspects have been stressed while others have been ignored – or in fact seriously transgressed.  This discordant record, dependent on the needs of the time as defined by technocrats shielded from democratic accountability, reveals – as we will see in part two – a lot about our current economic predicament.

Inflation – what a Hout!

As I write, Britain is bombing a former colony – one of the poorest countries on earth, the scene recently of the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis” according to the UN, which was caused by a war inflicted by the medieval limb-severing Saudi Arabian regime with British weapons. But trying to stop the genocide in Palestine is crime enough to resume the sorties. And they want ordinary people to actively help out with this never-ending war for civilisation!

But pause for a minute and consider the reason for ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’. The fear is that any continued obstruction to shipping routes in the Red Sea, which accounts for 15% of global sea trade, will reignite inflation, the bogeyman western governments and central banks have been trying to slay for the past two years or more.

I don’t want to minimise the problem of consumer inflation, to give it its proper name, which given that it causes massive rises in the cost of essentials like food involves real misery. This is exacerbated in an era when collective bargaining has been reduced to a rump of the economy so that wages can’t keep up with the price rises.

However, consumer inflation is not the only kind of inflation. Over many years, western countries have also been subject to asset price inflation – basically huge rises in the prices of shares and houses. In Britain, house prices have risen by about 1,000% since the early 1980s. And despite some ups and downs, the stock market across the western world keeps hitting record highs. In America it has enjoyed some of its best returns since the 1880s.

It is a basic axiom of our Thatcherite political mind-set that, in total contrast to consumer inflation, asset-price inflation is not something to dread. Quite the opposite, it is positively benign.

But, as we are now seeing, this is a travesty of the truth.

The inflation we like

So, unlike consumer inflation, the authorities have not tried to fight asset-price inflation. They have, by contrast, endeavoured to boost it at every turn and, if it seems to be flagging, to rekindle it with blatant forms of state intervention (despite the propaganda we don’t live in a ‘free’ market economy).

House prices in Britain have been deliberately stoked by restricting supply. It is a basic law of economics that if the supply of any good is suppressed, its price will increase.  This happened first through Thatcher’s ‘Right to Buy’ policy and was then reinforced by simply banning local councils from building new council houses. More recently, more direct forms of buttressing house prices have been necessary, for example the government’s ‘Help to Buy’ policy which is a simple subsidy to housebuilders.

The rise in share prices was first underpinned by legalising the process of share buy backs, banned in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. This has led to an internally-generated rise in share prices, caused by companies being pressured by their shareholders to ‘retire’ some of their shares, thus increasing the share price and the dividend payments to existing stock-holders. This practice has now become routine in the corporate world – according to economist Michael Hudson, publicly-listed American companies have, since 1985, retired more stock than they have issued.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, share prices have also been massively boosted by the artificial method of (electronic) money printing known as Quantitative Easing (QE). QE works by creating a huge mass of money, and by reducing the yield on government bonds, ‘incentivising’ investors to place it in the stock market or with other assets such as housing, or financing corporate mergers. According to investment manager, Kate Rogers, at venerable asset manager Cazenove, “Quantitative easing certainly stimulated asset markets. The billions that went from the banks to investors to buy the bonds was soon recycled into more attractively valued equities and property-boosting prices.”

This flagrant state intervention, practiced simultaneously in Britain, America, and Europe, is what lies behind the thriving stock market performance of the last decade or more (15% returns compared to an average of 9%). It is nothing to do with a healthy economy pushing up share prices. GDP growth, as we know, has been consistently poor for many years.

Of course, central banks are now pursuing the opposite policy to Quantitative Easing. ‘Quantitative Tightening’ involves selling assets to reduce liquidity in the financial system. This hasn’t (as yet but more on that later) produced a collapse in share prices. The conventional interpretation is that large companies are finally able to stand on their own two feet. But possibly QE under Covid was so huge – the creation of $834 million per hour – that the subsidy is still having an effect.

This is how it feels

The only way in which this asset-price inflation is commonly seen to have a downside is in terms of housing. The enormous rise in house prices – from an average of £26,000 in 1983 to £280,000 today – is regarded as a boon for the majority of people who already ‘own’ houses (or have mortgages on them). They can sit back and see their asset rise in value without having to do anything. But for young people who want to buy their first house – to ‘get on the housing ladder’ in common parlance – it’s a disaster. They frequently can’t even afford the deposit and are forced into permanent renting which, for those who have experienced it, is a distinctly unpleasant and insecure existence, apart from the fact that it soaks up most of your disposable income.

The last time houses were this unaffordable in Britain Benjamin Disraeli was Prime Minster.

However, with the resumption of consumer inflation and the central banks’ response of raising interest rates, the majority are no longer so content. They are, belatedly, seeing at first hand the malevolent side of asset-price inflation. Because house prices, with official blessing, have risen exponentially for decades, mortgages are a lot more expensive. And when interest rates rise above the minute level they have occupied for years, so do mortgage interest payments. This has resulted in huge increases in mortgage payments for many people. More than anything else, this lies behind the haemorrhaging of Conservative support in Britain. The private renting experience is going viral.

The share-owing oligarchy

What has happened to house prices might have its downsides, a defender of the status quo might argue, but surely there is little to object to in shares rising in value, the other main form of asset-price inflation? In fact there is. Undoubtedly some people benefit but the windfall accrues to a very small minority of share owners, including corporate executives who, these days, are all partially paid in share options. The original Thatcherite promise of a ‘share-owning democracy’ is now just a bad joke.

We now live in a resolutely two-track economy in which the stock market prospers while the real economy flounders. But given that rich people, who own shares, largely control the manufacture of public opinion, this experience doesn’t truly hit home. Thus the official opposition can come out with ludicrous non sequiturs like “when business profits, we all do” and are taken seriously.

The share price boom also comes at the cost of spiralling inequality. Since 2009, as the stock market has enjoyed nearly unprecedented gains, the wealth of the top billionaires in Britain has grown by 281%. In 2021, as actual economic activity was mothballed but massive amounts of QE ensured asset prices went skywards, the planet’s wealthiest people saw their balance sheets swell by $5 trillion. In Britain, since the pandemic, in the midst of the cost of living crisis, the number of billionaires has risen by a fifth.

Another trusted method of ensuring share prices go on rising – share buy backs – also damages the real economy. Because often the money companies use to buy back their shares (thus decreasing their number and raising their price) comes from funds that could otherwise be spent on business investment, they work to enrich their shareholder owners at the expense of wider economic health. Anaemic investment in production is a problem all over the western world.

The share price boom is not a win-win situation. It’s more like they win, you lose.

The economic trapeze

Central bankers – those who twiddle the dials of the world economy – are in a real quandary because of the actions of the Houthis. They believed they had, through historically moderate interest rates rises, solved the problem of the re-emergence of consumer inflation, as prices were heading downwards. They could then return to their prime function – ensuring that asset prices go on rising.

However, if global trade is impaired because of attacks on shipping in the Middle East, consumer inflation may return with a vengeance. If that happens, central bankers might feel they have no choice but to increase interest rates again, risking pricking the multi-asset bubble they have so carefully cultivated for the last decade or more.

It is a little appreciated fact that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was sparked after a rise in interest rates. In America, they rose, incrementally, from 1 per cent in 2003 to 5.25% in 2007. Really large rises in interest rates do cause recessions, as evidenced by the experience of Britain and America in the early 1980s when, to prepare the ground for the Thatcher and Reagan ‘revolutions’, rates were increased to 17/18% in full knowledge of the carnage that would – and did – follow.

Given that western economies are much more indebted than they ever were when John Lennon was murdered, much more modest rises could have a catastrophic effect. 

According to economist Radhika Desai, if the Federal Reserve raises interest rates to “required levels, the US can expect a recession that will make that of the 1980s seem like a boom”. The alternative to not doing so is, if the projected effect on world trade comes to pass, the return of chronic (consumer) inflation. “Both paths,” she says “will damage working class incomes and wellbeing”.

'To every one who has, more will be given'. Can Quantitative Easing last?

Austerity and Quantitative Easing, the two signature economic policies of the second decade of the 21^st century, possess an uncanny symmetry. The former was a brutal snatching away of funding from the poorest in society such that life expectancy was diminished, while the latter, despite the free market rhetoric, was – and is – a massive unconditional subsidy to the richest.

Both are profoundly ideological. Austerity was presented as a penance for the sin of previous overspending, a rooting out of waste and inefficiency and a long overdue imposition of “tough love” on the unemployed and disabled. Quantitative Easing (QE) was framed as a vital injection of liquidity into a flagging economy, technocratic medicine that, according to the BBC, encourages “people to save less and spend a bit more”.

Both conceptions are utterly misleading. The UK was never on the verge of becoming financially like Greece after the Eurozone debt crisis, and years of austerity failed to even make a dent on government debt. The huge rise in government borrowing precipitated by the Covid pandemic – more than £300 billion – and last year’s £16 billion hike in defence spending have both materialised without the gods of the market punishing us with financial ruin.

QE, meanwhile, was never about encouraging banks to make loans, companies to invest or consumers to spend money. Interest rates – the cost of borrowing money – are already so low as to provide adequate incentive for the taking out of loans or consumer spending in preference to saving. If people aren’t doing so, there must be other reasons for their reticence. “Think about it:” write the authors of Do Central Banks Serve the People? “if investors are reluctant to invest in the real economy with interest rates already at the zero lower bound, under what circumstances, if any, would extra liquidity be sufficient to change their mind?”

Thus the “extra liquidity” of QE, one must conclude, has remained within the financial system. The creation of $834 million dollars an hour by the world’s central banks has fuelled asset bubbles – in company shares, property and, after at first freezing in the wake of the pandemic, in corporate mergers and acquisitions. “Dealmakers”, it is comforting to know, “are having a record year”.

The classic explanation for inflation is too much money chasing too few goods. If the staggering amount of money created by central banks had really been “pumped into” the economy, as the bedtime story tells us, it would show up as inflation. Undeniably inflation is rising but not by anything like the level implied in the standard narrative of QE.

This indicates a crucial difference between austerity and QE. Both are ideological constructs but austerity has a placebo quality – its purpose lay entirely in the perception that it was necessary. QE – actual, real-world QE – by contrast really was, and is, necessary.

The Long 2010s

Government cannot go bankrupt, the gurus of modern monetary theory assure us. But the private sector definitely can and ever since the demise of Lehman Brothers in 2008, governments around the world have strained every sinew to ensure the contagion of insolvency doesn’t spread. The initial bank bail-out was followed by successive batches of QE around the world. The US Federal Reserve increased its balance sheet in the first tranche of QE by $4.5 trillion. The Bank of England has resorted to QE every time the economy has hit turbulence – after the credit crunch, after the Brexit vote and now during the pandemic.

It is commonly accepted that QE works to ensure, artificially, a low effective interest rate (whilst increasing the price and reducing the yield on government bonds, incentivising investors to shift into other assets). So-called zombie companies – firms that do nothing more than survive by meeting the interest payments on their debt and paying wages – are permitted to live on thanks to rock bottom interest rates. It is estimated that a fifth of US and European companies are zombies.

The silent assassin

Interest rates are a potentially devastating tool of government policy. When she first gained office in Britain, Margaret Thatcher hiked interest rates. They peaked at 17% in late 1979 and didn’t drop below 10% until 1983. The ostensible aim was to bring down inflation but the side effect, many think consciously pursued side effect, was to send countless companies to the wall – the UK’s manufacturing sector, which contained many unionised firms, shrunk by a quarter in the first wave of Thatcherism and unemployment rose to more than four million.

This mirrored what was happening in the US where a doubling of the interest rate – dubbed the “Volker shock” after the head of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volker – also precipitated a wave of bankruptcies and send unemployment soaring. The Volker shock also caused international interest rates to spike, triggering many developing countries to default on their loans and sparking the so-called Third World Debt Crisis. Mexico was the first to default in 1982 and others followed. Countries were forced to go cap in hand to the IMF which imposed free market structural adjustment programmes as a condition of support. Thus the worldwide market fundamentalism of today can plausibly be traced back to a massive rise in interest rates four decades ago.

So, for a seemingly arcane financial instrument, interest rates can have shattering consequences. And as a general rule, high interest rates cause bankruptcies while low interest rates preserve companies that would, under free market conditions, go under.

The Janus Face of Interest Rates

It might seem therefore that today’s ultra-low interest rates are a good thing – the government’s bank rate is currently 0.1%, the lowest for hundreds of years – because they stave off suffering both personally and for the economy as a whole. But it’s not that simple. Low interest rates, because they make the cost of borrowing so low, encourage speculation which is exactly the flaw in the economy exposed by the financial crisis and which has only got worse since. They also make it easier to be indebted.  In late 2020 non-financial corporate debt hit $11 trillion and for the first time exceeded global GDP.

Near zero interest rates thus have to remain incredibly low in order to make the debt they encourage manageable. But if, for example, inflation takes hold, higher interest rates may become necessary to combat it by damping down demand the economy. And inflation, it should be stressed, doesn’t just affect creditors and the wealthy. By making basic goods and outlays like rent more expensive, inflation makes life harder for most people.  Thus policymakers are in a quandary.

Low interest rates also seem to require endless QE, a perpetual subsidy to the wealthiest, to remain low. Obviously there is more than one kind of interest rate. The official bank rate, set by the Bank of England, is augmented by countless other interest rates –for example, the rates given or charged by commercial banks or mortgage interest rates. They will usually roughly follow the bank rate.

According to economist Harry Shutt, if markets were “undistorted” (i.e. didn’t have QE), banks and others would refuse to hold the huge debt of corporations without demanding a much higher interest rate. “Rates would have rapidly risen to unaffordable levels, probably 10 per cent or more,” he writes, “thus precipitating mass bankruptcy in both public and private sectors.”

Destined to Repeat it?

Clearly markets, notwithstanding the propaganda, aren’t suddenly going to become undistorted.  Authorities will use every weapon in the arsenal – no matter how much they contradict free market doctrine – to ward off systemic market collapse. They have also, one would assume, learned the lessons of the recent past. The 2008 Financial Crisis had its proximate cause in the steady raising of interest rates by the Federal Reserve (mirrored by other central banks). They rose from 1 per cent in 2003 to 5.25% in 2007. As a result US mortgage interest rates increased and holders of sub-prime mortgages began to default, leading to a nationwide collapse of the housing market.

So central banks will not willingly hike interest rates or end QE unless compelled to do so. They can, it might be assumed, continue to follow the example of Japan, which pioneered QE and has taken it further than anyone else. This is a world of low growth, low interests rates and low inflation – unequal, rigged and immensely unfair – which nonetheless persists for fear of the alternative. Or the pain of the real economy, probably exacerbated by inflation, could compel the authorities to change tack.

At present, the financial system and the economy most people actually inhabit seem to exist in near total isolation from each other. The former prospers while the latter suffers. If their fates realign, things could get very interesting.

You can read part one of this article here

 

 

 

 

 

The Long March of State Neoliberalism

Whenever neoliberalism is defined it is invariably equated with the osmosis of the ‘untrammelled free market’ into ever more areas of life.

One of neoliberalism’s intellectual originators – Friedrich Hayek – made the hugely influential claim that people (and by extension their political representatives) could never know enough to plan or intervene in the economy. A person’s knowledge was limited to “their own small circle” and the things which were important to them, which only they knew. Because knowledge was never available to people “in its totality”, attempting to direct the economy in certain ways or favour some economic entities over others was dangerous and inimical to the limited sphere of freedom people truly possessed.

The consequence of these assumptions was that only the free market could guarantee liberty. The only genuine choices people could make were to do with buying and selling because they concerned matters and desires that only they knew about. If markets were left alone and the price mechanism remained unregulated, the economy would achieve ‘equilibrium’ and people would receive what they wanted and were due.

These ideas have played a massive role in constructing the world in which we now live, in areas as diverse as electricity provision, financial services, corporate mergers and takeovers and the housing rental market (to name a few). The job of government was restricted to setting markets up and getting them running. Beyond that the state should get out of the way. It cannot, according to Hayek, know more than markets do. And while individuals within markets can make mistakes, markets as a whole – because they are an agglomeration of individually optimal choices – cannot be wrong.

Thus democracy – which is, in essence, about the ability of people to understand the world and act on their desires – should be heavily constricted. Indeed, we can be sure that had representative government and a universal franchise not already existed, neoliberals would not have invented them and would have opposed any attempts to create them – as their 19^th century forebears in fact did.

This ‘market fundamentalism, as many have noticed, requires a stronger state than the ‘night-watchman’ state of neoliberal yore. The state must not only enforce private property rights but also banish outside interference with markets. In practice, in the US, Britain and elsewhere, this meant destroying the power of the trade unions. Although voluntary, not statutory, organisations, trade unions distorted markets by intruding on their natural operations – by, for instance, insisting people were paid more than they were worth in ‘market terms’. The Conservative party in Britain, which under Thatcher became a truly Hayekian organisation, dutifully destroyed the power of trade unions.

However, the state as an entity never went away, and as the Covid-19 crisis has shown it has proved more important to neoliberalism than few can have imagined.

How low can you go?

The 2008 financial crisis was a major turning point. Not only did governments use their power to bail out banks and corporations – which under the law of the free market should have vanished – they instituted a regime of ultra-low interest rates. At these historically unprecedented levels – never going above 1% – they have two important effects. Firstly, they preserve insolvent, hugely indebted companies by reducing the amount of interest they have to pay on their debts. This is the polar opposite of the approach of the Hayekian Thatcher to manufacturing industry in the Britain in the early 1980s. She hiked interest rates – up to 15-17% – as a way of driving trade union-heavy manufacturing industry to the wall.

Secondly, they make any recovery of the private sector extremely difficult. Just as they make debts more affordable, ultra-low interest rates discourage investment by ensuring the financial return on advanced money is negligible (the tiny official bank rate was reflected in nominal interest rates in the economy as a whole and Quantitative Easing programmes made sure they stayed low). But in these circumstances, private companies naturally eager to make profits had somewhere to turn – the government.

The two phases of privatisation

In this they took advantage of the historic process of privatisation, which aside from the onslaught on trade unions and deregulating the economy, was the main way neoliberalism was implemented. In Britain, the “great divestiture” of privatisation had two distinct phases. In its early years privatisation was about simply transferring ownership of industries from the state to the private sector. In this way, companies like Jaguar, BP, Cable & Wireless, Rolls Royce, British Steel and even Thomas Cook were denationalised and had to sink or swim in the private sector. While some survived, others were taken over, heavily denuded (British Steel) or went bust – as was the fate of Thomas Cook last year.

But privatisation soon became much more ambitious. From the mid-1980s until now, it has been primarily about contracting out monopoly services from the state to the private sector. The (very long) list includes utilities (water, electricity etc.), railways, academy schools, NHS contracts, air traffic control, the Royal Mail, local authority outsourcing and care homes. Very often these services were funded – and continued to be funded – by the government and, most importantly, could not be allowed to cease to exist.

This very conditional privatisation was actually very welcome to the large companies that won the contracts to provide these services. They were anything but free markets zealots and were very glad for a guaranteed profit stream in the context of private sector torpor. As noted by health campaigner Allyson Pollock some years ago in terms of NHS privatisation, “the private health care industry is not interested in a purely private market. Its interests lie in becoming for-profit providers in a basic health system funded out of taxation.” An insight that could be applied across the board of modern privatisation.

Hence, Britain has seen the grown of private companies – such as Serco or Capita – that specialise in delivering public services. Potentially everything in the public sector – GP services, benefit assessments, prisons, school inspections, speed cameras, nuclear laboratories, early warning systems and even the operation of spy planes – was open to being run by the private sector on a contract basis.

The hollowing out of the state in the name of putative private sector efficiency and ‘sound management’ (ho, ho) has occurred across the world. A 2004 profile of Lockheed Martin in the New York Times noted:

Lockheed Martin doesn’t run the United States. But it does help run a breathtakingly big part of it. Over the last decade, Lockheed, the nation's largest military contractor, has built a formidable information-technology empire that now stretches from the Pentagon to the post office. It sorts your mail and totals your taxes. It cuts Social Security checks and counts the United States census. It runs space flights and monitors air traffic.

In one sense, this was – from the point of view of neoliberals – a welcome development that flowed naturally from the thinking of pioneers like Hayek: the state was creating and protecting markets. But in other ways, it had unforeseen consequences. Large oligopolies hoovered up contracts – far from competition letting a thousand flowers bloom, three or four companies – at most – reigned supreme. Competition, in the idealised vision of Hayek, meant “decentralised planning by separate persons”, but in no sense can the actually existing privatised state be described as decentralised or involving people, as opposed to large corporate entities. Only big companies had the resources to bid for government contracts and public sector monopolies – the object of neoliberals’ enduring enmity – became private sector oligopolies.

Secondly, democracy or government – the very thing neoliberals wanted to restrict and limit in its ambitions – was essential to the whole process of privatisation. Closeness to government was essential to winning contracts and a revolving door between the private sector and elected institutions and the civil service span permanently. This was an open door for corruption and a distortion of democracy but it was of no interest to neoliberals who were unconcerned about the distortion of something they didn’t like in the first place.

They were however concerned about the private sector and this became, thanks for the ultra-low interest rate regime, equally distorted. It is not a widely known fact the Austrian school of free market economics (of which Hayek and fellow neoliberal, Ludwig Mises, were the most prestigious members) was intensely distrustful of low interests rates because it holds them responsible for causing economic slumps (see the musings of former Tory and UKIP MP Douglas Carswell for a 21^st century version).

But although low interest rates potentially increase the amount of money circulating in the economy and make life easier for insolvent companies by reducing the interest of their debt, they make it difficult to make a profit on investments because the returns on offer are so low. The alternative is either to go for riskier private sector investments or to seek the security of government contracts which often offer double digit returns.

Since the financial crisis interest rates in Britain have never gone above a half of one per cent and, since the coronavirus lockdown, have been cut further – to 0.1%. This situation – in conjunction with the Hayekian ideology of successive Conservative governments – goes a long way to explaining the incompetence of the public response to the virus.

Useless and lethal

What was demanded was a smooth and joined up public health response, involving local councils, that prioritised above all else the needs of health workers and patients. What actually happened was a labyrinthine mess of competitive tendering and outsourcing which awarded contracts to large companies, like Deloitte and Serco that had no expertise in what they were supposed to do. The result, apart from “cementing the position of the private sector in the NHS supply chain”, has been a test and trace system that won’t be “fully operational” until September and a “useless” system of delivering PPE to NHS staff. The deaths of hundreds of NHS and care workers from the virus, many of them avoidable with proper PPE, as well as the highest excess death rate in Europe – in part the consequence of inadequate or non-existent PPE allowing the virus to spread in hospitals – cannot be divorced from this farrago.

But this is likely to merely be a trial run for what is in store. Against the backdrop of a huge fall in GDP of over 20%, the worst projected economic downturn of all major economies and mounting unemployment, the government will almost certainly proclaim a jettisoning of ‘ideological presumptions’ and commit to an interventionist, state-driven economic policy. A ‘green industrial revolution’ will be announced, aiming to create jobs and reskill millions of people.

Such a policy might even appear ‘socialist’ – a green industrial revolution was obviously the centrepiece of Labour’s offer at the last election – but the Conservative version will be careful to offer private companies profit-making opportunities at every stage of the process. It will be a like a souped-up version of the Work Programme. This can already be seen in the free school meal voucher scheme – the one extended over the summer holidays after the campaign by Marcus Rashford. A corporation – Edenred – is in charge of the scheme, not local councils. Astonishingly, the same company has been accused of “woeful” preparation and failing to send out vouchers to hundreds of thousands of parents who need them.

Facile comparison

This is why equating the current actions of the Conservatives in Britain with the policies of Corbyn’s Labour at the 2019 election is facile. The superficial resemblances – increased public spending, train nationalisation, a green industrial revolution – betray fundamentally antagonistic philosophies.

This is not a question of one being enthusiastically statist and other reluctantly so. It is matter of the Conservatives being committed to constructing a statist shell underneath which a privatised bevy of oligopolistic corporations running contracted out services are permitted to make a level of profits which the fêted free market can no longer provide. Some ‘Corbynite’ policies, such as a ‘national care service’ and ensuring 100% high speed broadband, would, it is true, have supplied a statist stimulus to the private sector. But others such as renationalising the NHS and utilities like water and electricity would have repealed the decades-long neoliberal hollowing out of the state.

But this, as we know, will not happen. Instead state neoliberalism, its intellectual roots now long forgotten, will continue its long march.

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