According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has precipitated “the largest oil supply disruption in history”, eclipsing the oil shocks of the 1970s in severity.
We are like the characters in the film On the Beach (about Australians waiting for the radiation from a nuclear war to reach them), biding our time before the effects seep through. Clearly, not only industries that directly consume oil will be affected. As fertilizers rely on natural gas for their production, decimated crop yields and ensuing food shortages – in addition to flight cancellations and severe inflation – will become the norm.
Bankers JP Morgan predict global oil inventories will hit “Operation Floor” – when oil production stops functioning – in September.
Already faced with 1970s-style stagflation (weak GDP growth and inflation), economies will soon have to deal with slumpflation (falling growth and inflation) says economist Michael Roberts.
This will happen regardless of whether there is a “final agreement” with Iran.
But doom-laden concentration on the inevitable effects of war clouds our judgement. It leads to the feeling that if only these random geopolitical shocks didn’t happen, everything would be fine.
But maybe, rather than being the root cause of crisis, a ‘shock’ like the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is merely exposing fault-lines that were already there.
And maybe there’s a mutually reinforcing dynamic at work. In that the weakness of the economic system generates geopolitical responses which have the effect of further enervating the economy.
Looking again at the oil shock of October 1973 – up until the halting of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the worst disruption of the global oil industry in history according to the IEA – is instructive. This older shock involved an oil embargo on countries like the US and UK and a fourfold increase in the price of oil.
Unquestionably this ‘triggered’ a financial crisis and a recession in 1974-75, the first year-on-year fall in output in the West since the Second World War.
But if the problem was merely external (a large increase in the price of oil) once it abated, things should have returned to ‘normal’ i.e. steadily increasing growth and prosperity. But that’s not what happened.
According to historian David Gibbs, the crisis resulted decades’ long flat productivity growth in the US and impaired economic performance in most of the rest of the world
“If you look at long-term rates of GDP,” he says, “it was quite high up until 1973 and in 1973 you see a big drop. And rates of economic performance have never fully recovered from the earlier period.”
It was “a historic break point”.
The same illusion of the primacy of the external cause can be seen in attitudes towards the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The crisis was caused, so goes the official story, by reckless bank lending leading to a seizing up of credit that the rest of the economy relies on. Now those causes no longer apply, businesses can get credit and the big banks, largely thanks to huge doses of Quantitative Easing, are no longer insolvent.
But if you look at UK economic growth in the pre- and post-crisis period, it is clearly debilitated, less than half as strong. In the 18 years since the 2008 crisis, the economy has grown by 22% compared to 53% growth in the 18 years before it.
Why should this be? Why, once the causes of the crisis are dealt with, should the crisis linger on, not in full-on crisis mode but in enfeebled performance?
Possibly because there was far more to the crisis than revealed by its surface ‘causes’.
To take medical analogy, if a person survives a heart attack but goes on to suffer worsening heart failure – not being able to walk far with running out of breath – the underlying problem should obviously be put down to heart disease, not sought in the particular circumstances that brought on the original heart attack.
But we do precisely this with the economy, continually, as economist Harry Shutt once said, mistaking symptoms for causes.
The former head of Goldman Sachs says he can “smell” a new financial crisis in the offing. This won’t happen, 2008-style, through the banks but in the burgeoning private credit industry where companies, such as private equity firms, lend to other companies.
If it does erupt, what will provoke this crisis will be a rise in interest rates to try and tamp down the inflation caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
According to chief economist of the World Bank, “the war is hitting the global economy in cumulative waves: first through higher energy prices, then higher food prices, and finally, higher inflation, which will push up interest rates and make debt even more expensive.”
But the external cause won’t explain the crisis. To do that we first need to explain why the global economy in the 21st century is so much more dependent on trade (i.e. globalised) than it was 50 years ago. Trade now represents about 60% of world GDP compared to 25% in 1970.
Then we need to consider the fact that the economy is much more deregulated than last time, a process which is ongoing. Finally, we need to factor in that the economy runs on huge levels of corporate and personal debt, which makes it so much more susceptible to any increase in the cost of debt (i.e. through higher interest rates).
And these causes are in turn related to the ending, caused by the oil shock of October 1973, of the “thirty glorious years” of strong economic performance after World War Two, and why that turned out to be a “historic break point”.
You cannot understand external shocks like the interruption of the ‘life-blood’ of oil supplies without also understanding how, internally, we are more vulnerable to their effects.