Echoes of the global financial crisis of 2007-9 are in the air. Both the US Nasdaq and the tech-heavy South Korean stock market have fallen heavily recently, prompted by threats by the US Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. Back in February 2007, stocks in the US and Asia also nose-dived, presaging ‘Debtonation Day’ in August of that year.
And the proximate cause of the credit crunch, which many very knowledgeable people assured us could never happen, was an incremental rise in interest rates.
But whether an almighty bubble is about to burst, as it has threatened to many times before, there is one thing we in the West can be sure of. We are living in a society defined by slow economic growth, which qualitatively distinguishes it from economies in most of the second half of the 20th century.
Statistics can lie but not here because they are so stark. In the decade to 2025, UK GDP grew by just 14%, an annual growth rate of just over 1 per cent. In the decade to 1965, growth was 37%, and economic growth per capita (growth adjusted for population growth) in the last 10 years has actually been negative.
The European Union has seen average growth of 1.3% over the last 19 years and 1.1% in the Eurozone. This is a decline from nearly 5% in the 1960s, 2.1% from 1973-83, and 1.6% in the 1990s.
The US, the world’s largest economy, has performed slightly better but the trends are still unmistakable. In the 1950s and ‘60s, the growth rate was above 4% before decreasing to around 3% in the 1970s and ‘80s. Over the last ten years, the average has been below 2%.
These are not figures relative to other economies. Other parts of the world, like China, have clearly been catching up over the last few decades. But the West’s growth decline is palpable without comparisons to other countries.
Nor, as an aside, is this what was meant to happen. Thatcher and Reagan’s ‘free market’ economic medicine was sold on the basis on reviving the economy, ushering in an era of prosperity. But as these supply-side prescriptions have bedded down into conventional wisdom, they have had precisely the opposite effect.
And slow growth has definite consequences. One of these is that ‘democratic’ government (to the extent that our government can ever really be called democratic’) gets absorbed by private economic power. Back in the 1930s, US President Franklin Roosevelt called this “the essence of Fascism”.
I was reading recently a book about “deaths of despair” in the US. These are deaths by suicide, drug overdose, or alcoholism, which the authors contend have shot up among white people without a degree since the turn of the century. There are many possible reasons, which I can’t go into here, but one factor is slowing economic growth.
“What may seem like small differences in growth rates have effects over long periods of time”, the authors, Anne Case and Angus Deaton (not that one), say.
One of these effects is increasingly bitter fights over distribution. “With lower growth, there is more pressure to shut out less successful groups”, they write. This “poisons politics”.
Such a poisoning can be seen in British politics in the demonisation of immigrants and refugees. Or in the intense concentration on attacking the very limited, and very conditional, benefits of sick and disabled people; an issue which simply didn’t exist prior to the 1990s, in an era marked by higher economic growth. The ‘problem’ of excessive benefits paid to vulnerable people has become an obsession of British politics in the age of austerity.
Case and Deaton also say that with slower growth, the “positive-sum game of innovation” gets usurped by “Rent-seeking”. This turns into a “vicious circle that impoverishes everyone”.
Rent-seeking does not just mean seeking housing rents from tenants, but the appropriation by powerful corporations of the existing income of government and society, rather than attempting to create new sources of wealth.
Based on these insights, the basic features of slow growth society, in Britain and elsewhere, can be identified.
In a slow growth society, living standards decline or stagnate
Wage rates in the US have been stagnating for half a century. In Britain, the process has been more telescoped but no less pronounced. According to the Resolution Foundation, if wages had continued to grow as they had been before the 2008 financial crisis, they would be 37% higher than they actually are.
This has taken place in the context of a decline in real GDP – GDP that takes account of a rise in population. “It is extremely difficult for living standards to rise in such circumstances” says socialist economist Michael Burke. Likewise, Case and Deaton say that in an economy growing at 2.5%, living standards double in 28 years but at 1.5% it takes 47 years.
Of course, in a strongly growing economy, there is no guarantee that income will be shared out. While global GDP has increased by 65% since 1990, for example, the number of people living on less than $5 a day has increased by 370 million.
But in a stagnant economy, there is even less chance of living standards increasing. Why should this be so? Partly this is because living standards are dependent on labour productivity which is in turn dependent on business investment. And both of these metrics have been falling over the last few decades. As Case and Deaton say, “investment is a prerequisite for growth, it embodies the latest knowledge and techniques and it raises productivity.”
In the absence of investment, business tends to concentrate on low-cost labour, possibly overseas, or cheap AI transformations. Neither of which raise living standards.
There is easy money to be made – for some people
But in these circumstances, capital is irresistibly attracted to something else – rent-seeking. This involves making money, not from consumer spending on new products, but from government revenues or unavoidable spending by consumers (on housing or heating costs, for example). Something that is already there and merely has to be tapped or exploited. The deal negotiated by pharmaceutical companies with the Starmer government to double NHS spending on new drugs over the next decade – the cost of which has been variously placed at £64 billion or £44.7 billion, causing hundreds of thousands of excess deaths – is a prime example of rent-seeking.
The “VIP Lane” created by ‘Boris’ Johnson’s Conservative government, to enable firms with political connections to the Tories to get PPE contracts under Covid, is another.
More generally, Britain’s ‘privatised’ utilities – in truth not genuinely privatised but contracted out – are a haven of rent-seeking. They provide both a monopoly ensured by the government and a captive market of consumers who have no choice but to buy the ‘product’ being sold. Unsurprisingly, charges have increased way beyond the rate of inflation.
But rent-seeking can occur in purely private sector settings. When a private equity consortium buys a company, in the process loading it down with debt, and then prepares it for re-sale by asset stripping it and increasing the charges to customers, that is rent-seeking. It is destructive to the viability of the firms that are acquired, but the ‘investors’ acquire massive profits.
These processes come to dominate entire economies. The Tories’ PPE scandal has been described as “the rule of contemporary British capitalism, rather than the exception”, while a recent report by UCL professor Mariana Mazzucato has characterised the European economy as a “capitalism of rent”, where income is captured not by producing anything but by achieving market power, and owning assets and charging for access to them.
It is no accident that this degradation has occurred in an era of slow GDP growth, where the levying of rent becomes a far more lucrative and risk-free strategy than actually creating anything.
In a slow growth economy, everything costs more – for a reason
As the Mazzucato report asserts, the crux of corporate strategies is the achievement of market power, which enables income to flow from charging people or other companies to access what you possess. This brings into focus another aspect of slow growth economies – an increase in price mark-ups.
A price mark-up is overcharging for products. According to orthodox economic theory, the price of goods is determined by the cost of the labour and raw materials it takes to produce them, plus a ‘normal’ rate of profit (as we are talking about a profit-based system).
But under a regime of price mark-ups, this normal level of profit becomes ever more elastic. According to one recent book on the cost-of-living crisis, the largest UK firms have massively raised their mark-ups over the last two decades, from 58% in 2002 to 82% in 2020.
This ability to profiteer, and impose what is essentially a private tax on consumers, is intimately related to size and market power. Research by the anti-monopoly group The Balanced Economy Project, reveals that for the world’s top 20 companies, in the five years to 2022, the average mark-up rose to around 50%. For the bottom half of firms (around 34,000 companies were studied), however, the average mark-up was just 25%.
And for some sectors of the economy – pharma or Big Tech for example – mark-ups can be huge, many hundreds of per cent.
The economist Isabella Weber coined the term “sellers’ inflation”, to account for the inflation that took hold after Covid-19 that, she said, was based on “the ability of firms with market power to hike prices”. In truth this process was happening before the Covid epidemic, but as inflation was so low few noticed.
A decade ago, the Economist magazine found that corporations in the US were raking in “exceptional profits” of $300 billion a year, equivalent to a third of taxed operating profits. Some sectors of the US economy were seeing price rises of double the rate of inflation. This, at a time when inflation was negligible (indeed there was a pervasive fear of deflation). Of course, GDP growth was tiny as well, lower than it had been since before World War Two.
What is interesting is that these price mark-ups were occurring in the most concentrated parts of the American economy. In the same article, the Economist analysed 900 sectors of the US economy and found that 2/3rds had become more concentrated between 1997 and 2012.
Not only do high mark-ups contribute high profits and high market value, they are enabled by it. When it comes to charging much more for your products than it takes to produce them, the bigger you are the better.
Which leads to another insight.
Bigness is a curse
In the late 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt called attention to a “concentration of private power without equal in history”.
0.1% of corporations in America, he told the US Congress in 1938, owned 52% of the assets of all of them. Now that figure has risen to 90%.
Roosevelt said something else in his speech, delivered in the midst of the Great Depression. That the history of modern times “proves that in times of depression concentration of business speeds up. Bigger business then has a larger opportunity to grow still bigger at the expense of smaller competitors who are weakened by financial adversity.”
We are undoubtedly now faced with, and have been for some time, conditions of “financial adversity”.
A slow growth economy means generalized financial adversity — not just among people struggling to make ends meet but among small businesses who are dependent on consumer spending or may be the suppliers of corporate behemoths like Amazon.
One group, though, palpably not suffering from financial adversity are large corporations. Corporate profits are at all-time highs, eclipsing previous all-time highs achieved a few months before.
And the large are getting larger. According to Goldman Sachs, “despite uncertainty in the global economy” mergers and acquisitions – which by definition involve the creation of ever larger economic and financial entities – could hit $3.8 trillion in 2026, surpassing the previous peak in the Covid-year of 2021.
Received wisdom has it that the threat of Fascism is nurtured by conditions of inequality, poverty, anxiety, and a lack of social mobility. Conditions that will call out for scapegoats to be found which temporarily soothe the anxiety.
But if we listen to Roosevelt who was speaking when Nazism was approaching its zenith, that isn’t the whole story. Fascism also has an economic corollary, what he called “a cluster of private collectivisms” … “masking itself as a system of free enterprise” that seeks to control democratic government.
Fascism doesn’t just base itself on the exploitation of popular discontent among its mass base. It also has an elite element, which finds nourishment, as it did in the 1930s, in the conditions of a slow growth society.
What Roosevelt termed the “essence of Fascism” is what I want to consider in the second half of this article.
