The Long March of State Neoliberalism

Whenever neoliberalism is defined it is invariably equated with the osmosis of the ‘untrammelled free market’ into ever more areas of life.

One of neoliberalism’s intellectual originators – Friedrich Hayek – made the hugely influential claim that people (and by extension their political representatives) could never know enough to plan or intervene in the economy. A person’s knowledge was limited to “their own small circle” and the things which were important to them, which only they knew. Because knowledge was never available to people “in its totality”, attempting to direct the economy in certain ways or favour some economic entities over others was dangerous and inimical to the limited sphere of freedom people truly possessed.

The consequence of these assumptions was that only the free market could guarantee liberty. The only genuine choices people could make were to do with buying and selling because they concerned matters and desires that only they knew about. If markets were left alone and the price mechanism remained unregulated, the economy would achieve ‘equilibrium’ and people would receive what they wanted and were due.

These ideas have played a massive role in constructing the world in which we now live, in areas as diverse as electricity provision, financial services, corporate mergers and takeovers and the housing rental market (to name a few). The job of government was restricted to setting markets up and getting them running. Beyond that the state should get out of the way. It cannot, according to Hayek, know more than markets do. And while individuals within markets can make mistakes, markets as a whole – because they are an agglomeration of individually optimal choices – cannot be wrong.

Thus democracy – which is, in essence, about the ability of people to understand the world and act on their desires – should be heavily constricted. Indeed, we can be sure that had representative government and a universal franchise not already existed, neoliberals would not have invented them and would have opposed any attempts to create them – as their 19^th century forebears in fact did.

This ‘market fundamentalism, as many have noticed, requires a stronger state than the ‘night-watchman’ state of neoliberal yore. The state must not only enforce private property rights but also banish outside interference with markets. In practice, in the US, Britain and elsewhere, this meant destroying the power of the trade unions. Although voluntary, not statutory, organisations, trade unions distorted markets by intruding on their natural operations – by, for instance, insisting people were paid more than they were worth in ‘market terms’. The Conservative party in Britain, which under Thatcher became a truly Hayekian organisation, dutifully destroyed the power of trade unions.

However, the state as an entity never went away, and as the Covid-19 crisis has shown it has proved more important to neoliberalism than few can have imagined.

How low can you go?

The 2008 financial crisis was a major turning point. Not only did governments use their power to bail out banks and corporations – which under the law of the free market should have vanished – they instituted a regime of ultra-low interest rates. At these historically unprecedented levels – never going above 1% – they have two important effects. Firstly, they preserve insolvent, hugely indebted companies by reducing the amount of interest they have to pay on their debts. This is the polar opposite of the approach of the Hayekian Thatcher to manufacturing industry in the Britain in the early 1980s. She hiked interest rates – up to 15-17% – as a way of driving trade union-heavy manufacturing industry to the wall.

Secondly, they make any recovery of the private sector extremely difficult. Just as they make debts more affordable, ultra-low interest rates discourage investment by ensuring the financial return on advanced money is negligible (the tiny official bank rate was reflected in nominal interest rates in the economy as a whole and Quantitative Easing programmes made sure they stayed low). But in these circumstances, private companies naturally eager to make profits had somewhere to turn – the government.

The two phases of privatisation

In this they took advantage of the historic process of privatisation, which aside from the onslaught on trade unions and deregulating the economy, was the main way neoliberalism was implemented. In Britain, the “great divestiture” of privatisation had two distinct phases. In its early years privatisation was about simply transferring ownership of industries from the state to the private sector. In this way, companies like Jaguar, BP, Cable & Wireless, Rolls Royce, British Steel and even Thomas Cook were denationalised and had to sink or swim in the private sector. While some survived, others were taken over, heavily denuded (British Steel) or went bust – as was the fate of Thomas Cook last year.

But privatisation soon became much more ambitious. From the mid-1980s until now, it has been primarily about contracting out monopoly services from the state to the private sector. The (very long) list includes utilities (water, electricity etc.), railways, academy schools, NHS contracts, air traffic control, the Royal Mail, local authority outsourcing and care homes. Very often these services were funded – and continued to be funded – by the government and, most importantly, could not be allowed to cease to exist.

This very conditional privatisation was actually very welcome to the large companies that won the contracts to provide these services. They were anything but free markets zealots and were very glad for a guaranteed profit stream in the context of private sector torpor. As noted by health campaigner Allyson Pollock some years ago in terms of NHS privatisation, “the private health care industry is not interested in a purely private market. Its interests lie in becoming for-profit providers in a basic health system funded out of taxation.” An insight that could be applied across the board of modern privatisation.

Hence, Britain has seen the grown of private companies – such as Serco or Capita – that specialise in delivering public services. Potentially everything in the public sector – GP services, benefit assessments, prisons, school inspections, speed cameras, nuclear laboratories, early warning systems and even the operation of spy planes – was open to being run by the private sector on a contract basis.

The hollowing out of the state in the name of putative private sector efficiency and ‘sound management’ (ho, ho) has occurred across the world. A 2004 profile of Lockheed Martin in the New York Times noted:

Lockheed Martin doesn’t run the United States. But it does help run a breathtakingly big part of it. Over the last decade, Lockheed, the nation's largest military contractor, has built a formidable information-technology empire that now stretches from the Pentagon to the post office. It sorts your mail and totals your taxes. It cuts Social Security checks and counts the United States census. It runs space flights and monitors air traffic.

In one sense, this was – from the point of view of neoliberals – a welcome development that flowed naturally from the thinking of pioneers like Hayek: the state was creating and protecting markets. But in other ways, it had unforeseen consequences. Large oligopolies hoovered up contracts – far from competition letting a thousand flowers bloom, three or four companies – at most – reigned supreme. Competition, in the idealised vision of Hayek, meant “decentralised planning by separate persons”, but in no sense can the actually existing privatised state be described as decentralised or involving people, as opposed to large corporate entities. Only big companies had the resources to bid for government contracts and public sector monopolies – the object of neoliberals’ enduring enmity – became private sector oligopolies.

Secondly, democracy or government – the very thing neoliberals wanted to restrict and limit in its ambitions – was essential to the whole process of privatisation. Closeness to government was essential to winning contracts and a revolving door between the private sector and elected institutions and the civil service span permanently. This was an open door for corruption and a distortion of democracy but it was of no interest to neoliberals who were unconcerned about the distortion of something they didn’t like in the first place.

They were however concerned about the private sector and this became, thanks for the ultra-low interest rate regime, equally distorted. It is not a widely known fact the Austrian school of free market economics (of which Hayek and fellow neoliberal, Ludwig Mises, were the most prestigious members) was intensely distrustful of low interests rates because it holds them responsible for causing economic slumps (see the musings of former Tory and UKIP MP Douglas Carswell for a 21^st century version).

But although low interest rates potentially increase the amount of money circulating in the economy and make life easier for insolvent companies by reducing the interest of their debt, they make it difficult to make a profit on investments because the returns on offer are so low. The alternative is either to go for riskier private sector investments or to seek the security of government contracts which often offer double digit returns.

Since the financial crisis interest rates in Britain have never gone above a half of one per cent and, since the coronavirus lockdown, have been cut further – to 0.1%. This situation – in conjunction with the Hayekian ideology of successive Conservative governments – goes a long way to explaining the incompetence of the public response to the virus.

Useless and lethal

What was demanded was a smooth and joined up public health response, involving local councils, that prioritised above all else the needs of health workers and patients. What actually happened was a labyrinthine mess of competitive tendering and outsourcing which awarded contracts to large companies, like Deloitte and Serco that had no expertise in what they were supposed to do. The result, apart from “cementing the position of the private sector in the NHS supply chain”, has been a test and trace system that won’t be “fully operational” until September and a “useless” system of delivering PPE to NHS staff. The deaths of hundreds of NHS and care workers from the virus, many of them avoidable with proper PPE, as well as the highest excess death rate in Europe – in part the consequence of inadequate or non-existent PPE allowing the virus to spread in hospitals – cannot be divorced from this farrago.

But this is likely to merely be a trial run for what is in store. Against the backdrop of a huge fall in GDP of over 20%, the worst projected economic downturn of all major economies and mounting unemployment, the government will almost certainly proclaim a jettisoning of ‘ideological presumptions’ and commit to an interventionist, state-driven economic policy. A ‘green industrial revolution’ will be announced, aiming to create jobs and reskill millions of people.

Such a policy might even appear ‘socialist’ – a green industrial revolution was obviously the centrepiece of Labour’s offer at the last election – but the Conservative version will be careful to offer private companies profit-making opportunities at every stage of the process. It will be a like a souped-up version of the Work Programme. This can already be seen in the free school meal voucher scheme – the one extended over the summer holidays after the campaign by Marcus Rashford. A corporation – Edenred – is in charge of the scheme, not local councils. Astonishingly, the same company has been accused of “woeful” preparation and failing to send out vouchers to hundreds of thousands of parents who need them.

Facile comparison

This is why equating the current actions of the Conservatives in Britain with the policies of Corbyn’s Labour at the 2019 election is facile. The superficial resemblances – increased public spending, train nationalisation, a green industrial revolution – betray fundamentally antagonistic philosophies.

This is not a question of one being enthusiastically statist and other reluctantly so. It is matter of the Conservatives being committed to constructing a statist shell underneath which a privatised bevy of oligopolistic corporations running contracted out services are permitted to make a level of profits which the fêted free market can no longer provide. Some ‘Corbynite’ policies, such as a ‘national care service’ and ensuring 100% high speed broadband, would, it is true, have supplied a statist stimulus to the private sector. But others such as renationalising the NHS and utilities like water and electricity would have repealed the decades-long neoliberal hollowing out of the state.

But this, as we know, will not happen. Instead state neoliberalism, its intellectual roots now long forgotten, will continue its long march.

.